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 This thesis examines the changes regarding women and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ+) serving and toxic masculinity in the United States 
Armed Forces from the end of Operation Just Cause to the War on Terror, which includes 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The role of women and 
LGBTQ+ within the military changed significantly from late 1980s-2010. During the 
1990s, sex abuse scandals and homophobic murders raised public awareness of the toxic 
masculinity that existed in the military. Toxic masculinity is an extreme expression of 
hegemonic masculinity, which promotes masculine supremacy, strict gender roles, and 
devalues women.  This thesis analyzes occurrence rates, dynamics that might contribute 
to the elevated rates of sexual assault within the Armed Forces, and the impact of military 
sexual violence. It also explores the military's reaction to sexual assault amongst those 
who serve, as well as proposals for further improvement. Gendered violence remains an 
ongoing problem within and outside of the military service. To eradicate sexual assaults 
and homophobic violence requires new programs and most important cultural change. 
There also needs to be additional assessments of the existing programs to ascertain their 
efficiency. This thesis argues that a close examination of the years following  “Operation 
Just Cause,” will reveal that a “toxic masculine” subculture exist within the post-Cold 
War US Armed Forces that employs gendered violence and refuses to accept policy 
changes of the Department of Defense that removed service restrictions on women and 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Gender-based violence frequently occurs in areas of armed conflict and within 
military societies.1 War, sexual assault, and many other types of aggression are nothing 
more than extreme manifestations of patriarchy, which is a desire for masculine 
domination. There exists a skewed perception amongst many Americans that this does 
not happen in the United States. Many people do not realize how patriarchal the US 
society is, especially its armed forces and war. In their article “Gender-Based Violence 
and Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Area,” Rashida Manjoo and Calleigh McRaith 
contend:  
War is an inherently patriarchal activity, and rape is one of the most extreme 
expressions of the patriarchal drive toward masculine domination over the 
woman. This patriarchal ideology is further enforced by the aggressive character 
of the war itself, that is to dominate and control another nation or people.2 
In the previous two decades, gender-based violence (GBV) connected to the United States 
involvement in military conflicts received a great deal of attention. The implications of 
violent behavior towards women leads to countless efforts that address issues of 
accountability and impunity for perpetrators. Despite attempts to deal with problems of 
GBV in war and post-war regions and to increase awareness, GBV persist as a major social 
problem. In the United States and many places around the world, women suffer gender-
targeted abuses. 
Many consider that GBV is an unfortunate consequence of war. The belief that 
gender-targeted violence represent acts of individuals born out of anger and frustration 
                                                 
1 Bernard M. Levinson, Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, 
(London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2004), 203. 
 
2 Rashida Manjoo and Calleigh McRaith, “Gender-Based Violence and Justice in Conflict and 





once held sway. However, in recent times, challenges to the traditional perspective have 
come about to explain the increase in rates of GBV committed by military forces. One 
view suggests that the United States military and the armed forces of various countries 
willfully use sexualized violence as an instrument of war, in order to destabilize and 
degrade the population of an enemy nation.3 GBV attacks serve as a means to threaten 
personal security, but also as way to instill fear and terror in a population.4 I argue that 
the systematic exclusion and segregation of women and members of the LGBTQ+ 
community contributed to a backlash and regulation of those considered to be gender 
traitors as integration into male dominated areas occurred. This thesis argues that the 
exclusion and segregation of women and members of the LGBTQ+ community in the 
armed forces promoted negative stereotypes and prejudices against these minority 
groups. As gender integration happened a backlash occurred in the form of gender based 
violence intended to regulate the behavior of women and LGBTQ+ service-members. 
Additionally, the US armed forces systematically used GBV as a strategy of war and 
control. Much of the existing mainstream scholarship regarding the armed forces 
overlooks or omits violence committed against women and the LGBTQ+ community 
within the services. Some feel that such a study may bring discredit upon the Armed 
Forces, while others viewed it as an unpatriotic endeavor that aims to destroy the 
constructed image of the noble warrior. This study aims to examine an often-neglected 
part of military history. 
                                                 
3 Lindsay Stark and Michael Wessells,“Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War,” JAMA The Journal 
of the American Medical Association 308, no. 7 (1996): 677-8. 
 




One of the areas in which this commonly occurs is in the United States Armed 
Forces. The rise of gender-based violence in the US military is nothing more than the 
reaction to challenges to its established patriarchy. Changes in the roles that women play 
in the military today place them in closer contact with the opposite sex than in previous 
times. These work and social environments situate women with some men who hold 
archaic belief regarding gender roles. Some men believe that, women are only for men to 
dominate and they do not belong in the military. Sexual violence is one of the expressions 
of this extreme ideology.5  
Sexual assaults and other gender related issues continue to cause problems for the 
criminal justice system of the United States armed forces; which deals with sexual assault 
in a different manner than the non-military community. In recent years the, the 
Department of Defense received heavy criticism for the way it dealt with sexual assault. 
Despite the scrutiny, sexual assault remains problematic. According to Defense 
Department’s Directive 6495.01, The Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) 
program, founded in 2004, defined sexual assault as: 
Intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or 
abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault 
includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual 
contact that is aggravated, abusive, or wrongful (including unwanted and 
inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts to commit these acts.6  
Army Regulation 600-20 chapter 4-15 also prohibits any relationship between all 
permanent party personnel and initial entry training trainees beyond training mission 
                                                 
5  “World Report on Violence and Health” (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002), 149, 
https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/global_campaign/en/chap6.pdf  
 






requirements. The military considers any sexual relationship between a non-trainee 
servicemember and a trainee as nonconsensual due to the power differential.7 SAPR also 
found that prior to the 1990’s; documentation of sexual assault was virtually non-existent. 
One of the oldest known cases involving sexual assault in the military happened during 
the Vietnam War, the details of this case are unknown.8 Very little academic research 
exists concerning sexual assault of military women in Vietnam. Despite the continual 
growth of scholarship on rape of US servicemembers, only a few studies and analysis 
exist related to the Vietnam era.9 From 1965 to 1973, the US Army conducted court 
martial proceeding for eighty-six rape related cases, which resulted in fifty convictions.10 
Most of the sexual assaults cases prosecuted dealt with those perpetrated against civilian 
women. However, a further analysis of indicated that many female Vietnam veterans did 
not report their attacks. Veterans Administration surveys disclosed that twenty-nine 
percent of the women who served during the Vietnam era reported sexual assault.11 
The military, like other patriarchal institutions around the world places strong 
emphasis on loyalty, duty, respect, leadership, solidarity, and emotional control. The 
masculine ideals promoted by the services encourage attitudes of domination, 
                                                 
7 Department of Army, Army Regulation 600-20: Army Command Policy, (Arlington, VA,: 
Department of the Army), 26. 
8 Danielle Christenson, Chain of Command: The Barriers of Reporting Sexual Assault in the 
Military (Thesis, Bridgewater State University, 2014). 
 
9 Gina Marie Weaver, Ideologies of Forgetting Rape in the Vietnam War (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2010). 
 
10 Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1975), 98-99. 
  
11 Anne G. Sadler, Brenda M. Booth, Deanna Nielson, and Bradley N. Doebbeling,  
“Health-Related Consequences of Physical and Sexual Violence: Women in the Military,” Obstetrics and 





aggressiveness, self-reliance, and thrill-seeking.12 The long history of peer group bonding 
in male-only environments promotes hyper-masculinity, which bases interactions on 
competition, dominance, and control.13 The power disparity between the sex in the 
military, that arises from its male-dominated culture and leadership, significantly 
influences sexual misconduct.14 There is a link between gender based violence and the 
long-established beliefs regarding masculinity and the negative attitudes towards 
femininity.15 Additionally, homophobia within the armed forced increases the likelihood 
of gender based violence. The stigma associated with the label “homosexual” serves as a 
means of power and control that often discourages victims, especially male, from 
reporting.16 
Hyper-masculine men may perceive competent women and weak effeminate men 
as a threat, requiring them to regularly attest their manliness through language and actions 
that are sexual in nature. Some service-women mentioned that they felt scrutinized, 
resented and perceived as less capable than their male counterparts.17 The military 
establishment’s utilization of sexualized and gendered jargon when referring new recruits, 
promotes psychological detachment and objectification.18 
                                                 








16 Carl Andrew Castro, Sara Kintzle, Ashley C. Schuyler, Carrie L. Lucas, and Christopher H. 
Warner, “Sexual Assault in the Military.” Current Psychiatry Report (May 2015) 17:54. 









Women of the Armed Forces: A Brief History 
The history of women in the US Armed Forces is one of a constant struggle for 
change against a resistant patriarchal culture. From the American Revolution to present 
day global conflicts, the women served in the military, as combat soldiers (sometimes 
disguised as men), spies, cooks, nurses and other supporting roles. 
Although the official policies from American Revolution to the end of the Second 
World War prohibited or restricted women’s service, it did not deter women who 
disguised themselves as men or fought alongside their spouses in battle. For example, 
during the American Revolution Deborah Sampson Gannett disguised herself as Robert 
Shurtlieff  and served in the continental Army for seventeen months.19 The military 
discharged her after finding out her true sex.20 Traditionally, the military remained a male 
dominated culture that generally excluded women from certain roles in the service of 
their country.   
Different sources provide varying figures regarding the actual number, but 
somewhere between 33,000 and 49,500 women contributed to US military efforts in the 
First World War. One source estimated that approximately 33,000 service-women served 
with 20,000 of them part of the Army and Navy Nurse Corp.21 While another source 
states that the number female volunteers during the war reached about 49,500.22 More 
                                                 
19 Alfred F. Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier. 
(Vintage, 2005), 4-5. 
 
20 Ibid., 5. 
  
21 Margaret C. Harrell, and Laura L. Miller. New Opportunities for Military Women Effects Upon 
Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale, (No. RAND-MR-896-OSD. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA), 
1997, 1.  
 
22  William B. Breuer and Fereydoun Hoveyda. War and American Women: Heroism, Deeds, and 




than 10,000 deployed outside of the continental United States and 400 died in the 
performance of their duties.23 
During the Second World War, more than 350,000 women at home and overseas 
served as nurses, pilots, administrators, mechanics, and other combat support roles.24 
During the course of the war, enemy forces captured eighty-eight women and held them 
as POWs (prisoners of war).25 At the conclusion of the Second World War women 
pressured lawmakers, in spite of opposition, to officially integrate women into the 
military. On June 12, 1948, President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services 
Integration Act of 1948 into law, which applied to the entire armed forces.26 
Approximately 86,300 women served in the military during the Korean War. 500 
deployed as nurses to the Korean theater of operation where they provided medical 
support on the ground and on hospital ships.27  
The number of service-women during the Vietnam War era (1962–1972) 
exceeded 7,000. Most of the volunteer women served as nurses throughout the branches 
of the armed forces.28At the close of the Vietnam War and the end of the conscription, the 
US military began transitioning into an all-volunteer force. As this change occurred, 
                                                 
 
23 Rosemarie Skaine, Women at War: Gender Issues of Americans in Combat, (London: 
McFarland & Company, 2012), 66. 
 
24 Harrell and Miller, New Opportunities, 1.  
  
25 Elizabeth Scannell-Desch and Mary Ellen Doherty, Nurses in War: Voices from Iraq and 
Afghanistan, (Springer, 2012), 7. 
 
26 Harrell and Miller, 1. 
 
27 United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Data on Korean War Veterans,( United States 






military occupational options opened for women, such as entry in to military academies 
and skilled jobs. Some of the new military occupational skills open to women included 
communication technicians, truck drivers, military police and supporting roles that did 
not require front line duty.29  Nevertheless, restrictions remained on combat missions. As 
weapons technology and approaches to warfare transformed in the latter part of the 20th 
century, the Pentagon concluded that gender became less relevant in combat.30  
Those who oppose women’s participation in the military often contend that the 
average woman does not possess the physical strength required for battle; they often 
invoke that males generally possesses greater upper body strength. The exclusion of all 
women based on an average constitutes discrimination based on sex. For example, West 
Point graduate Major Lillian Pfluke, who consistently achieved the maximum on the 
Army physical fitness test and first-class score on the Marine Corps men’s physical 
fitness test could not become an infantry officer. Gender and cultural norms in Iraq and 
Afghanistan restricted physical contacted and interactions between males and females 
forced the US military assign women to direct combat units in order search civilians and 
homes.31  
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and others (LGBTQ+) of the Armed Forces: 
A Brief History 
On March 11, 1778, at Valley Forge, PA, with the approval General George Washington, 
a Continental Army General Court Martial panel tried and convicted Lieutenant Gotthold 
                                                 
29  John Cushman, “History of Women in Combat Still Being Written, Slowly,” New York Times 
(Feb. 2012).  
 
30 Wood. “A History of Women in the US Military.”  
 





Frederick Enslin of “attempting to commit sodomy,” with a male soldier identified as 
John Monhort and perjury. Three days after the legal proceedings Washington wrote his 
approval of the verdict “with Abhorrence and Detestation of such Infamous Crimes.”32 
As a result of his conviction, Lieutenant Enslin became the first known member of the 
United States Armed Forces dishonorably discharged from the United States Armed for 
sodomy.33  
Since the American Revolution, documentation revealed that the Armed Forces of 
the United States prohibited sodomy, a punishable offense, but it did not address the issue 
of sexual orientation until the Articles of War of 1916. On March 1, 1917, this set of 
regulations intended to “address the incidence of sodomy within the military population 
went into effect.”34 A revision to the Articles of War came soon after to make it clear as 
to what entailed engaging sodomy. In 1920, following the conclusion of the First World 
War, the Articles of War identified consensual sodomy as “criminal behavior” that 
carried the punishment of a jail sentence. Despite these policy revisions the military made 
no genuine effort to separate gay men from the service until Second World War.35 
In 1941, the Selective Service developed ways in which to identify and bar 
homosexual draftees from military service. In addition to excluding recruits found guilty 
of sodomy, the Selective Service refused to accept suspected homosexuals as well, based 
                                                 
32 United States Naval Institute, 2010. 
 
33 Randy Shilts, Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the US Military. (New York: St. 
Martin’s Griffin, 2005), 11-12. 
 
34 National Defense Research Institute, Sexual Orientation and US Military Personnel Policy: 
Options and Assessment (1993), 3. 
35 Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, The US Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy: A 





upon what it designated as “homosexual proclivities.” In their effort to identify recruits 
with “homosexual proclivities,” the selective service, “screened for feminine body 
characteristics, effeminacy in dress and manner and a patulous (expanded) rectum.”36 In 
the following year, in 1942, a psychiatrist in the armed forces claimed that homosexuality 
was a “psychopathic personality disorder” that rendered them mentally unfit to meet the 
demands of combat.37 
The beginning of the United States’ involvement in the Second World War 
signified a sharp decline in number of court-martials of service members perceived as 
gay. Troop mobilization made military legal proceedings impractical, so service-
members instead received a blue discharge (also known as a “blue ticket”) for suspected 
homosexuality.38 Many blue discharge veterans faced discrimination when they applied 
for GI Bill benefits. A policy change in April 1945 directed Veterans Administration 
officials to consider “blue” discharges for homosexual acts or propensities as 
dishonorable.39 The exact number of actual LGBTQ+ troops who received blue 
discharges from December 7, 1941 to June 30, 1945, remains unknown, however, a US 
Congressional House Report estimated that there were as many as 51,936 veterans.40  
In 1949, a directive issued by the Department of Defense (established in 1947 as 
the National Military Establishment) unambiguously banned gays and lesbians from 
                                                 
36 William N. Eskridge, Dishonorable Passions: Sodomy Laws in America, 1861-2003, (Penguin 
Books 2008), 84. 
 
37 United States Naval Institute, 2010. 
 
38 Allen Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War 
Two, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990), 132. 
 
39 Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire, 228. 
 




serving in the United States Armed forces. The Defense Department order stated, 
“Homosexual personnel, irrespective of sex, should not be permitted to serve in any 
branch of the Armed Forces in any capacity, and prompt separation of known 
homosexuals from the Armed Forces is mandatory.”41 This order also emphasized the 
supposed inferior nature and alleged security risks associated with their service.42  
Article 125 of the uniform code of military justice defined sodomy as, “unnatural 
copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex.” According to military 
regulation, sodomy did not necessarily equate to homosexuality and the rules applied to 
heterosexual as well. Initially, the military rule regarding homosexuality focused 
exclusively on men; however, as women entered the services in more significant 
numbers, the policies expanded to include lesbians.43  
The armed forces continued its anti-homosexuality policy in November 1972, 
with Army Regulation 635-200, which established guidelines for commanding officers to 
discharge enlisted “homosexual acts.” In 1981, Defense Directive 1332.14 unequivocally 
asserted that “homosexuality is incompatible with military service;” which made it 
mandatory to discharge troops who “engaged in, has attempted to engage in, or has 
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act.” 44 
The exclusion of women, masculinity, and the authoritarian command structure 
created a setting favorable to gender-based violence. The absence of women in certain 
                                                 
41 Nathaniel Frank, Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens 
America (Macmillan, 2009), 9. 
 
42 Bérubé, Coming Out Under Fire, 261. 
 
43 Embser-Herbert, The US Military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy, 4-5. 
 




areas of the military produced an environment that fostered negative stereotypes and 
prejudices regarding women; giving rise to erroneous assumptions of masculine 
superiority and feminine inferiority. Some service-members embraced the ideology of 























Chapter 2: Historiography: Gendered Violence in Literature 
Gender-based violence transcends demographic boundaries; this social problem is 
a byproduct of hyper-masculine environments that associates femininity with weakness 
and inferiority. The US military and other militaries around the world employ it as a 
weapon of war. This work intends to identify the significant scholarship from various 
academic disciplines, which contribute to this subject, its historiography, the 
methodologies, and the influences of major historiographical changes. The analysis of 
secondary sources in this work seeks to explain the views the authors promote, their 
contributions, use of evidence, interpretations, the influence of the changes in the study of 
history, socio-economic-political and technological factors. This examination pursues an 
understanding of the motivations for interpretation, comparisons in methodologies, and 
the central themes. The historiographical aspect intends to analyze works related to 
masculinity and violence directed against a person based on gender along with the main 
arguments in the armed services. 
The inflicting of physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering based on 
gender or gender roles are forms of deviance. Susan Caffrey and Gary Mundy’s The 
Sociology of Crime and Deviance: Selected Issues (1995) is an inter-disciplinary work 
that places emphasis on subject matters associated with the sociology of crime and 
deviance. The authors produced their work in the 1990s at the dawn of the third wave of 
feminism, which challenged the paradigm of the second wave and tended to interpret 
gender and sexuality from a post-structuralist perspective. They divide their compilation 
into four comprehensive sections. The areas included in their research are: social 




and gender, with attention to women as offenders and victims; a critical examination of 
the criminal justice system, particularly police methods and courtroom procedures; and 
the place of the mass media in the social construction of crime and deviance.45 The 
authors provide clarifications for the distinction regarding ethnicity, gender, and age; the 
media’s role in depicting criminal and deviant behavior in a multitude of ways; the 
problems that occur when applying statistics in any assessment of crime; the criminal 
justice system’s institutional structure and processing of offenders from their preliminary 
arrest to the subsequent punishment it delivers.    
The authors employ a realist criminology methodology; which emerged in the 
1980s as a distinct approach to studying crime. Caffrey and Mundy builds upon the 
secondary source Rethinking Criminology: The Realist Debate by Jock Young and Roger 
Matthews, which explained this concept in “Ten Points of Realism.”46 
Through their work, Caffrey and Mundy contribute to the discussion of gender-
based violence in the military by providing a prolific study that provides insight on the 
crime and deviant tendencies found among human beings which includes members of the 
armed forces. The identification of criminal characteristics may assist researchers in 
developing various perspectives on the different gender-based violent crimes committed 
by service-members. The context of this book specifically states different influences 
directly involve gender-based violence such as sexual violence, moral panic, masculinity, 
femininity and many others. The book is an excellent source of information regarding 
crime and deviance. While this is primarily a historical work, I intend to add to Caffey 
                                                 
45 Susan Caffrey and Gary Mundy. The Sociology of Crime and Deviance: Selected Issues, 






and Mundy’s work by including from sociological, criminal justice, political science and 
psychological stand point that focuses on the United States Armed forces.   
Accounting for Rape is a work by Irina Anderson and Kathy Doherty that 
examines perceptions regarding sexual assault is. In this work, Anderson and Doherty 
present an innovative perspective on the issue of rape, centering on female and male 
sexual violence.47 The authors explore common views concerning rape, victim-blaming 
and the normalization of sexual assault in discussions about sexual violence. They 
integrate interdisciplinary, broad psychology, social psychology, and 
feminist perspectives in their methodology in order to understand how the definition of 
rape and rape victimhood reflect the socioeconomic and political conditions of the 
society. Anderson and Doherty utilize mainly a third wave and post-feminist-approach in 
the development of this work.  
Anderson and Doherty argue that the cultural constructions of hegemonic gender 
and heterosexuality and the supportive practices in institutional and mundane settings 
fuel and legitimize sexual assault. Sexual violence is a commonplace experience and is a 
means for the maintenance of patriarchy. The authors contend that it is important to 
examine the social response to sexual violence within the context where rape claims 
rarely receive a clear, supportive and positive response. They support their argument 
using quantitative data obtained from interviews. Their discussion of the attitudinal 
characteristic of the observer exposes views and beliefs on gender roles, stereotypes and 
                                                 
47 Irina Anderson and Kathy Doherty Accounting for Rape: Psychology, Feminism and Discourse 





rape myths. One of the weaknesses of this work is that it fails to discuss societal attitudes 
to the rape of transgendered people.  
Anderson and Doherty realized that previous social psychological research failed 
analyze the political significance of rape supportive reasoning, which is the cognitive 
excusing, tolerating, or even condoning sexual assault and rape. The authors analyze and 
examine conversational data to produce a work that critically interrogates prevailing 
theories and methodologies. They collected their data from individuals and institution 
that include Amnesty International, New Directions in Attributions Research, Male 
Victims of Sexual Assault, American Medical Association, Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology, and others. The incorporated qualitative data attainted from 
interviews and previous research to support their argument is one of the many strong 
points of this work. 
Accounting for Rape: Psychology, Feminism and Discourse Analysis in the Study 
of Sexual Violence contributes discussion of gender-based violence in the military by 
investigating rape and sexual violence, which also occurs in the military. It provides a 
critical cross-examination of prevalent theories and methodologies, and a thought-
provoking evaluation of conversational data. It explores every day accounting practices in 
regard to reports of female and male rape. The authors bring together discursive 
psychology and a feminist standpoint in order to explore how the definition of rape and 
rape victimhood reflects the social, political, and cultural conditions of society.  
In Honor Betrayed, Dr. Mic Hunter moves past the headlines to reveal the reality 
of sexual abuse in the military. The military cultural indoctrination turned trainees into 




intimidating, hyper-masculine, dehumanizing setting that our young men and women face 
within the armed forces. Women and gay men are the most vulnerable to sexual abuse in 
the military. His work includes first-person narratives from US servicewomen and men 
sexually abused by fellow comrades, which included a woman’s case that reached the US 
Supreme Court. Hunter also investigates the implicit toleration of these incidents within 
the services and the prisoner abuse scandal by US troops in Iraq. My work builds on 
Hunter’s work, examining the unwillingness to change the patriarchal culture that 
produced sexualized violence.  
Hunter argues sexual abuse occurs far too often in the United States Armed 
Forces; its existence within the ranks and greatly compromises the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the military. He points out that this behavior is contrary to good order and 
discipline and brings discredit upon the services. Additionally, this adversely affects 
mission readiness by creating an unsafe environment that hinders the military’s ability to 
acquire and retain quality personnel. Military leaders must adequately address this issue 
to reduce the number of victims, emotional suffering and financial expenses related to a 
criminal investigation, trials, punishment, and disability claims due to sexual abuse. He 
supports his arguments through interviews with victims and documents from the United 
States Department of Defense. 
His work builds on Brian Mitchell’s Women in the Military: Flirting with 
Disaster which addresses major military sex scandal during the 1990s. The author 
obtained his primary source documents and statistical sources from the Psychiatric 
Clinics of North America, Medical Review of Reviews, Archives of Sexual Behavior, 




Psychology, US Department of Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence, US 
Department of Defense, and many others.  
Hunter comments on the fact that in the past, the military rarely mentioned sexual 
abuse. For example, the highest-ranking woman ever to serve in the US Armed Forces, 
Major General Jeanne Holm does not touch this topic in her 544 page book on Women in 
the Military: An Unfinished Revolution, nor does Tommy Franks’ book, The American 
Soldier.48 
Honor Betrayed contributes to the discussion of gender-based violence in the 
military by addressing sexual harassment and sexual abuse within the ranks. Hunter 
discusses in depth every characteristic and facet of sexual abuse/violence in the armed 
forces, primarily the United States Army. He also goes into further complexities that 
show evidence of the harmful psychological abuse one has when sexual abuse occurs. He 
also points out that there are massive flaws amongst the armed forces in properly 
educating service members on how to report sexual abuse.  
In focusing on the military Sara Zeigler and Gregory Gunderson’s Moving 
Beyond G.I. Jane constructs a necessary contribution to the standing literature on the 
ever-expanding role of women in the United States Armed Forces. The authors offer 
meticulous investigations of contemporary discussions over the opening of combat roles 
to women and the appropriate way to deal with sexual harassment within the ranks. The 
monograph incorporates tangible recommendations concerning the way the military 
should handle these major personnel problems. Their survey of Reserve Officer Training 
                                                 






Corps (ROTC) cadets provided additional data on the attitudes of future leaders. It 
revealed that nearly sixty percent of the cadets they surveyed believed that military 
should allow women to volunteer for direct combat positions, whereas forty-one percent 
objected. The book also pinpoints critical approaches in which female service-members 
can increase efficiency as the forces adapt to its new role in the twenty-first century. 
Zeigler and Gunderson argue that the main obstacle to transitioning to a 
postmodern military to meet the mission requirements by a postmodern world is one of 
attitude. The postmodern military refers to armed forces in the years after the Cold War. 
The women pioneering the efforts to build a postmodern (post-Cold War era) military 
must overcome the barriers in their minds and in the minds of the men with whom they 
serve. In this endeavor, they need to prove their merit while at the same time overcoming 
hostilities from those who should befriend and support them. The authors made strong 
arguments through their use of the survey results. For example, they state that forty-nine 
percent of all respondents thought that the military should bar women from infantry 
positions.49 
The authors’ failure to mention the women warriors of the Battle of Nasiriyah, 
other than Jessica Lynch, is a weakness. Zeigler and Gunderson do not discuss Private 
First Class (posthumously promoted to Specialist) Lori Piestewa or Specialist Shoshana 
Johnson and their responses in combat. The inclusion of this information would provide a 
more balanced picture of that event. On the other hand, the quantitative data presented 
from surveys given to service-members and ROTC cadets on the topic of permitting 
women to serve in combat arms units yielded valuable information. The authors also 
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include the questions asked in the survey to ROTC students. Additionally, Zeigler and 
Gunderson identified the problem areas and provide recommendations for addressing 
them.   
Moving Beyond G.I. Jane: Women in the US Military contributed to the 
understanding of the patriarchal system by offering an analysis of the role of women in 
the history of the US military. It covers the history of the debate of opening more military 
specialties to women and integrating them into combat. The authors explain that women 
trailblazers in traditionally male-only field encountered resistance in the form of gender-
based violence. This work also includes the history of the contribution of women in 
militaries around the world. Zeigler and Gunderson provide the reader with numerous 
examples of arguments presented in the past in opposition to integrating combat arms 
units along with quantitative statistical data. For example, some leaders argued that 
gender integration in combat units could potentially reduce their effectiveness due the 
male instinct to protect women; however, the authors point out that in Iraq and 
Afghanistan when enemy forces engaged gender-integrated units, this did not occur. 
Zeigler and Gunderson’s book represents an excellent source of information on the 
history of the role of women in the Armed Forces. My work addresses gendered violence 
against women and LGBTQ+ service-members as well, it identifies toxic masculinity as 
the common cause for the violence and discrimination directed at women and LGBTQ+ 
troops.   
Masculinities and Violence is part of Research on Men and Masculinities series, 
which examines the association between men and violence. In this work, Lee H. Bowker 




three essays that comprise Part I outlines the means through which men come to know 
violence and put it into practice. Part II concentrations on the types of abuse men inflict 
upon women and children. Part III draws attention to violence perpetrated by men on 
men. Finally, Part IV studies organizational violence and men. It is necessary to 
comprehend the nexus of masculinities-violence is critically significant to discovering 
methods to lessen the masculine propensity to violent behavior. This insightful work is a 
valuable source of information for all those studying gender roles, men's studies, and 
relational violence. 
Bowker’s “On the Difficulty of Eradicating Masculine Violence” argues that 
individuals, institutions, and programs generally fall short in doing away with masculine 
violence because their efforts mainly focus on a single area, although masculine 
violence’s roots lie within in a multilayered system, social, cultural, personality, 
biological and economic. Masculine violence is overdetermined rather than merely 
caused. One systemic intervention may be useful within the system on the area in which 
they focus, but they cannot suppress it since its roots rest on multi-systems. Part III of this 
work contains an article by James W. Messerschmidt that points out that white 
supremacy rests on the domination of white masculinity over the masculinity of people of 
color. Messerschmidt identifies lynching as an expression of white masculinity to 
maintain dominance. In this article, Messerschmidt argues that “white masculinity is 
inextricably tied to race.”50 
This work incorporates and builds on the previous volumes that comprise the 
Research on Men and Masculinity series especially Steve Craig’s Men, Masculinity, and 
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the Media. My analysis examines how the military’s unique brand of “toxic masculinity” 
influenced gendered violence within its ranks, whereas Bowker focused primarily on 
civilians.  
Masculinities and Violence contributes to the discussion of gender-based violence 
by explaining the association between the attitude of manliness and its influence on 
aggressive behavior. It explains how social construction originated and evolved along 
with society. This work includes writing that discuss how masculinity traces its origins to 
patriarchal societies of the past. Bowker’s volume also looks at how masculinity 
influences violence in politics, military, and other areas of society. One example found in 
the article by James Messersmidt speaks about hegemonic and subordinated masculinities 
and their relationship to men on men and racial aggression.51 Another example located in 
part two, chapter four mentions the correlation between domestic violence and woman’s 
economic dependency on a man. In many cases, but not all, men victimizing women and 
men victimizing men in the armed forces and the rest of society results from the 
influences of masculinity. Overall, this volume contains valuable information for anyone 
researching the history of masculinity’s influence on gender-based violence in the armed 
forces.   
Bowker’s work contends that the critical study of men and masculinity transcends 
any national border, ethnic group, or identity politics. The sociology of masculinity now 
draws on a highly pluralistic scholarship, and consequently, benefits from vast and 
diverse audience. 
 
                                                 






The Masculinities Reader by Stephen M. Whitehead and Frank J. Barrett offers a 
wide-ranging, unobstructed and comprehensive presentation to the fundamental debates 
on the study of masculinity. In an organized and understandable format, the book makes a 
wide range of topics available in a single volume that include male authority, patriarchy, 
sexualities, hegemonic masculinity, violence, families, media, and postmodernism. The 
introductory chapter of this source probes into masculinity in crisis, concepts of identity, 
and post-feminism. By acknowledging the universal viewpoints of gender change, this 
work extracts from various studies around the world. Whitehead and Barrett produced 
this work in the early 2000s and reflected the third wave feminist influence, such as the 
social construction of gender.52 This work provides important information for both 
researchers and students examining men and masculinities. 
The Masculinities Reader adds to the discussion of gender-based violence in the 
military by compiling various writings that present qualitative and quantitative data 
collected by researchers around the world. The articles incorporated included a US Navy 
study as part of this international collection. The military is a hyper-masculine society 
that stress’s power and domination while at the same looking down on weakness and 
subjugation; which it associates with femininity. This work provides and multicultural 
perspective greatly assists in understanding that gender-based violence in the military and 
other societies is simple an expression of masculinity.  
Scholarly works related to gender based violence in the United States armed 
forces are primarily from a psychological, sociological, anthropological, and 
                                                 





criminological perspective. This shortage of historical works forced many researchers to 
heavily rely on the efforts of these academic fields. In many cases, written works 
generally exhibit characteristic a period of history. For example, literature from the 1960-
70s reflects the second wave of feminism that tended to express the white middle-class 
woman’s point of view. In addition to this, patriotic attitudes that may discourage the 
production of works that chronicle gender-based violence in the armed forces. The 
academic definition of what constitutes the past causes researchers to depend heavily 
upon non-historical works. Scholarship in the future will exhibit influences from the 
emerging fourth wave or post-feminist interpretation and an interdisciplinary perspective. 
This manuscript utilizes data from sociological, political science, psychological, 
and historical resources to produce a work of history of that analyzes the struggles of 
women and the LGBTQ+ members of the armed forces from the latter years of the cold 
war to 2010 as the same. A vast majority of the history writings of the Armed Forces 
neglect to discuss gendered violence in the armed forces. In this work, I illustrate how 
military’s resistance to change and unwillingness to part with its patriarchal culture in the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century is fueled by an extreme aspect of 
“hegemonic masculinity” which is often referred to as “toxic masculinity.” The concept 
identified as “toxic masculinity” relates to the hostile expression beliefs, norms, and 
behaviors associated with masculinity, that are physically and psychologically harmful to 
women, men, children, and the overall society.53 
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Chapter 3. Post-Cold War Conflicts, Policy Changes, and Gendered Violence  1989-
1995 
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States Armed Forces emerged as 
an institution drastically different from the one that emerged from the defeat in Vietnam.  
The military rebuilt itself as an all-volunteer force that employed new doctrines to meet 
the needs of modern warfare in any region of the world.  In 1990, the military was 
smaller, highly trained and prepared to engage in an intense war against the best fighting 
forces in the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Pact caused some to question the need for a powerful military. Many American 
politicians wanted to reduce the number of active duty service-members. Some 
Americans thought that the peace following the Soviet collapse negated the need for a 
large military establishment; however, events unfolding in the early 1990s challenged the 
practicality of force reduction.54  
Operation Just Cause: A Woman Leading US Troops into Combat 
In the early 1980s, Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega supported efforts by the 
US to contain and overthrow communism in Central America. Noriega’s backing won 
him praised from the White House, despite the 1983 Senate committee’s findings that 
Panama served as a major hub for drug trafficking. In 1984, Noriega interfered with the 
Panamanian presidential election to insure the victory of his puppet candidate, Nicolás 
Ardito Barletta. Despite Noriega’s undemocratic activities, the Reagan administration 
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continued to support him as a valuable ally in the US president’s efforts to remove the 
communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua.55 
In 1986, allegations surfaced regarding Noriega’s past activities that involved 
drug trafficking and money-laundering, while working with the CIA. Furthermore, 
reports also exposed Noriega as a double agent, who surreptitiously worked for the 
Sandinistas and Cuban intelligence. Two years later, the US government severed it ties 
Noriega, and federal grand juries in Tampa and Miami indicted him on charges of drug-
smuggling and money-laundering.56  
In 1988, the Department of Defense established the guiding principles for all the 
branches of the armed forces to utilize when classifying military occupational specialties 
and organizational units as male only, known as the “Risk Rules.” These guidelines 
excluded women from specific support units and locations on the battlefield if the 
possibility of exposure to direct combat, enemy fire, or capture equated to or exceeded 
the hazards encountered by related combat units in the same theater of operations.57 In 
essence this policy barred females from certain military jobs, units and locations during 
combat operations. 
As tensions between the Panamanian Defense Forces and US military and civilian 
personnel increased in the Panama Canal Zone, Noriega nullified the results of the 1989 
presidential election which projected Guillermo Endara as the winner. President George 
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H. W. Bush deployed additional military forces to the Panama Canal Zone as the 
situation continued to escalate. On December 16, guards positioned at a PDF roadblock 
shot and killed an off-duty US Marine.58 The following day, President Bush authorized 
the execution of “Operation Just Cause,” the US invasion of Panama to remove Manuel 
Noriega from power and bring him back to the United States to stand trial.59 
On December 20, 1989, the US invasion of Panama in the execution of Operation 
Just Cause (OJC), tested the implementation of the Risk Rule by the Direct Combat 
Probability Code. The additional US troops deployed from other installations to join the 
US military personnel already stationed in Panama. The OJC task force consisted of 
18,400 US servicemembers, which included approximately 800 servicewomen (four 
percent of the total number of troops).60 “The Risk Rule” also prohibited some women 
from functioning in certain specialist roles. For example, the Army replaced a female 
military intelligence analyst with expertise on Panama with a male who possessed no 
knowledge of the area, due to concerns of her exposure to direct combat. Replacing a 
highly qualified person in a critical position with someone less experienced during a 
deployment into a hostile situation defies common sense. In this situation adherence to 
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the “Risk Rule” resulted in the poor utilization of human resources that potentially placed 
both the mission and military personnel at risk.61   
US military forces swiftly defeated Noriega’s Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). 
In approximately four days, the United States military gained control of a large portion of 
the country and forced Noriega to request sanctuary at the Vatican embassy in Panama 
City. The US military installed Guillermo Endara as the new Panamanian president. After 
assuming office, Endara directed the PDF to disband.62 On January 3, 1990, Noriega 
surrendered, and US Drug Enforcement agents arrested him.63  
In the effort to topple the Noriega regime, twenty-three US servicemembers, three 
US civilians, an estimated 150 PDF soldiers, and approximately 500 Panamanian 
noncombatants lost their lives. The Organization of American States and the European 
Parliament made an official condemnation of the invasion as a blatant breach of 
international law.64  
In 1992, a US jury found Noriega guilty of drug trafficking, racketeering, and 
money laundering, marking the first time in history that the US legal system convicted a 
foreign head of state of criminal charges. Noriega received a sentence of forty years in a 
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US federal prison. Years later, after extradition and incarceration in Panama, Noriega 
died on May 29, 2017, at hospital in Panama City.65 
Servicewomen from every branch of the armed forces contributed to OJC in 
Panama.  For example, army and air force women served as military police, helicopter 
pilots, truck drivers, supply specialist, navigators, load planners and flight engineers, 
while others received assignments to the army Signal Corps or Military Intelligence (MI) 
units. Despite rules excluding them from combat, women encountered small arms and 
mortar fire from Panamanian Defense Forces as they transported personnel and supplies 
by land and air into heavily defended areas. Two female Blackhawk helicopter pilot 
earned the Air Medal for successfully transporting troops under enemy fire, however, the 
actions of Army Capt. Linda Bray in Panama became the central point in congressional 
debates regarding the ineffectiveness of the “Risk Rules” and the future of women in 
combat.  
US Army Cpt. Linda Bray of the 988th Military Police Company led 
approximately thirty to forty five soldiers in an armed confrontation with a Panamanian 
special operations unit situated at a military installation comprised of barracks and a dog 
kennel.  Cpt. Bray received orders to lead troops under her command to take control of an 
enemy compound used to house PDF military dogs. When opposition forces refused to 
surrender the location, a firefight erupted; Troops under Bray’s command killed three 
enemy combatants, captured one and forced the withdrawal of those remaining, with no 
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US casualties. At the conclusion of the encounter Bray and her soldiers discovered a 
stockpile of grenades, assault rifles, and ammunition.66 
Bray’s valor received national attention in the news media and created huge 
controversy. Marlin Fitzwater, the spokesman for then-President George H.W. Bush 
described Bray as heroic. In spite her mission success, Cpt. Bray did not receive the same 
recognition for her combat actions as her male counterparts, on the contrary, she drew 
criticism from both military and civilian authorities. Senior-ranking officer and top 
officials at the Pentagon responded in a less enthusiastic manner, some even alleged that 
Bray embellished the accounts of the events related to the combat victory over an elite 
Panamanian Defense Force unit.67  
In her explanation of the reaction of her senior leadership, Bray stated, “the 
responses of my superior officers were very degrading, like, what were you doing there? 
A lot of people couldn’t believe what I had done, or did not want to believe it. Some of 
them were making excuses, saying that maybe this really didn’t happen the way it came 
out.”68 The army also conducted an investigation of Bray in regard to allegations of 
illegal activities. Panamanian officials accused Bray and her troops of unlawfully 
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destroying government and personal property. An army inquiry eventually cleared Bray 
and her soldiers of any misconduct.69 
The army restrictions on military occupational specialties (MOS) and assignments 
made Bray and other female soldiers, who engaged enemy forces in ground contact 
during the Panamanian invasion ineligible for the Combat Infantryman Badge (CIB) 
award. Army regulations restricted eligibility for the CIB to only infantrymen assigned to 
an Infantry, Rangers or Special Forces brigades or smaller units, holding the rank of 
colonel or below, who engaged in active ground combat. Women could not receive the 
CIB because army policies excluded her from any infantry career fields and unit 
assignments. The army presented Bray with the Army Commendation Medal for Valor, 
however, this award only recognized her accomplishments in a non-combat capacity. In 
1991, Cpt. Bray resigned her commission and received a medical discharge after she 
sustained an injury during training. She served a total of eight years on active duty.70 Her 
leadership on the battlefield paved the way for the women who came after her. 
In the US Congress, a fierce debate erupted as lawmaker attempted to explain 
how Bray and other women ended up engaged in ground combat. Rep. Patricia 
Schroeder, D-Colo, introduced legislation to repeal the law that prohibited women from 
serving in positions that may involve direct combat. She mentioned Cpt. Bray’s actions 
as evidence to reinforce her argument.71 In spite of living proof to the contrary, top 
generals single-mindedly claimed that women lacked the capacity to endure the physical 









demands of combat. In his statements before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Gen. M.R. Thurman, then the commander of the US Southern Command, testified, “The 
routine carrying of a 120-pound rucksack day in and day out on the nexus of battle 
between infantrymen is that which is to be avoided and that’s what the current Army 
policy does.”72 The military top brass successfully persuaded lawmakers to oppose 
Schroeder’s bill and as a result the ban on women participating in combat remained the 
official policy.73 Despite the efforts of Rep. Schroeder and the document evidence of 
actions of Cpt. Bray and the other service-women during Operation Just Cause the ban of 
women in direct combat remained law, however, several months later, Operation Desert 
Shield/Storm exposed the ineffectiveness of the “Risk Rules” in keeping women out of 
harm’s way.  
Operation Desert Shield/Storm 
The role of women would further expand when on August 2, 1990, Iraqi Forces 
overran the defenses of its oil rich neighbor, Kuwait. The government of Iraq annexed 
and partitioned the small country, with one part falling under the provincial authority of 
Basra and the remaining becoming its nineteenth province. Additionally, there were fears 
that Saudi Arabia would suffer a similar fate. 
The United States, an ally of Kuwait, vociferously denounced the annexation, 
which violated international law. A United Nations’ resolution declared that Iraq had to 
leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. Shortly afterward, soldiers from multinational forces 







deployed to protect Saudi Arabia from a possible invasion and to prepare for military 
actions to liberate Kuwait.  
Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm served as one of the significant 
moments for military women. From August 1990 to February 1991, the United States 
Armed Forces deployed approximately 41,000 servicewomen to perform combat 
operations in Southwest Asia.74 Desert Shield/Storm, at that time, became the largest 
deployment of American women in US history. Women comprised close to seven percent 
of the total military personnel, which included officer and enlisted ranks from active 
duty, National Guard and reserve units.75 Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm also 
exposed the inefficiencies of the “Risk-Rule,” as this policy failed to protect women from 
death or capture. During Desert Shield/Storm, thirteen women lost their lives and two 
became prisoners of war in the performance of their duties.76  
During the Persian Gulf War, Iraqi forces took twenty-three Americans troops as 
prisoners of war, amongst this group of detainees were two women. One of the female 
captives was Specialist Melissa Rathbun-Nealy, who enlisted in the US Army on 
September 1988. From September to November 1988, she conducted and completed her 
Initial Entry Training at Fort Dix, New Jersey. In February 1989, she finished her 
Advanced Individual Training as a heavy vehicle operator at Fort Leonard Wood, 
Missouri, and received orders assigning her to the 233rd Transportation Company at Fort 
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Bliss, Texas. In October 1990, she deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Operations 
Desert Shield/Storm.77  
On January 30, 1991, after mistakenly veering off the intended route, Rathbun-
Nealy and another soldier ended up in the midst of a firefight near the Iraq border. Iraqi 
forces captured both of the vehicles occupants, thus making Rathbun-Nealy the first 
enlisted female Prisoner of War in the history of United States military.78 Rathbun-
Nealy’s ordeal revealed that the restrictive policy that banned women from serving in 
combat units failed to safeguard them from direct encounters with enemy forces.  
The other female taken prisoner during “Gulf War” was Major Rhonda Cornum, a 
Cornell University graduate with a doctorate in biochemistry and nutrition. She joined the 
United States Army and received her commission in 1978. Major Cornum graduated 
from the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in 1986. She served with 
the 229th Attack Helicopter Regiment as a flight surgeon. On February 27, 1991, while 
on a search and rescue mission to locate the pilot of a downed F-16, enemy forces shot 
down the UH 60 Blackhawk helicopter carrying Cornum and other crew members. Five 
members of the crew died, while Cornum and two others survived. In the crash she 
fractured both arms, sustained a bullet wound to her right shoulder, along with other 
injuries. Trapped beneath the wreckage of the aircraft, she dug her way out, in spite of the 
pain.79  
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Iraqi military forces in the area captured Major Cornum and the other survivors. 
Iraqi guards loaded Cornum and another US prisoner into a pickup truck to move them 
from underground shelter to a small prison. While in transport, one of the captors 
unzipped Cornum’s flight suit, and as her assailant pulled her flight suit over her injured 
areas, she screamed in pain and sexually assaulted her. Using a blanket to conceal his 
inappropriate actions from his comrades, the guard kissed and fondled her breast.  
According to Cornum, the guards never raped beat or tortured her.80 
During her eight days of captivity, Major Cornum displayed a warrior’s firm 
resolve to endure under extremely harsh conditions. Her survival evidenced that mental 
toughness has nothing do with sex or gender. The circumstance surrounding her capture 
revealed that the nature of military operation required women to perform their wartime 
mission near enemy forces, thus increasing chances of captivity.81   
On March 5, 1991, approximately a week after the war concluded, the Iraqi 
government released Cornum, Nealy-Rathbun, and several other prisoners.82 Both 
women continued their military service after the war. In August 1992, the Department of 
the Army reassigned Nealy-Rathbun to Fort Hood, Texas, where she finished her active 
duty service on November 3, 1993. Afterwards she transferred to the US Army Reserve, 
where she received an honorable discharge on June 25, 1996.83  
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The POW experience of Cornum and Nealy- Rathbun set off an intense debate 
over the role of women in combat amongst citizens and elected officials. Lawmakers 
opposed to changing policies to allow women to serve in combat referenced to Major 
Cornum's experience as a war captive as proof of female vulnerability and that no male 
detainees reported experiencing sexual assault.84 The arguments of those resisting the 
change severely weaken when examined from a historical perspective. Opponents of 
removing gender restrictions in combat totally disregarded the fact that these women 
survived POW captivity just as the “Angels of Bataan” (service-women taken prisoner by 
Japanese forces in the Philippines during the Second World War) and the tendency of 
male survivors not to report sexual assaults perpetrated against them.85  
Unfortunately, some of the service-women became war casualties of a different 
type.86 Shortly after the conclusion of Desert Storm, twenty-four women reported that 
they experienced sexual assaults. One of the reported sexual assaults came from Spc. 
Jaqueline Ortiz, who served in the Army and deployed to Saudi Arabia during the Persian 
Gulf War, she was the only woman mechanic in her unit. According Ortiz she gathered 
her gear and reported to Sergeant Martinez’s tent. She explained to the Senate panel that 
while leaving the tent Martinez pushed her to the floor and forcibly sodomized her. She 
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reported it to her male superiors, but they did not believe her.87 Spec. Ortiz’s case was 
just one of approximately twenty-four that occurred during this conflict.  
The revelations of these sexual assaults ignited the debate over whether women 
should serve in combat.88 Army officials, who were mostly men attempted to dispute the 
significance of the reports by comparing them to assaults in US cities of comparable size. 
Military officials did express in speeches and documents that the rapes were matters of 
utmost concern and that it would conduct investigations.  
Changing the Rules on Women in Combat  
On April 28, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin removed some of the 
restrictions from combat exclusion policy. These new changes permitted women to serve 
in just about any aviation role; however, the ban continued to apply to aviation units 
directly in ground and special operations combat. In 1994, the Department of Defense 
proclaimed, “Service members are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they 
are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units below the 
brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.”89 
 
The Combat Exclusion Policy remained in place for ground fighters and 
prevented the assignment of women to units according to the organization’s immediacy 
to direct combat or "collocation."90 Units with direct combat missions include Infantry, 
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Armor, Artillery, Rangers, or Special Forces. Collocation happens when, "the position or 
unit routinely physically locates and remains with a military unit assigned a doctrinal 
mission to routinely engage in direct combat."91 For example, highly qualified female 
medics could not serve in a medical unit within an infantry brigade due the proximity to 
direct combat and collocation.92  
Tailhook Incident 
In Las Vegas, Nevada, from September 8- 12, 1991, the Tailhook Association 
held its 35th annual symposium.93 The Tailhook Association describes itself as 
“independent, fraternal, nonprofit organization internationally recognized as the premier 
supporter of the aircraft carrier and other sea-based aviation.”94 Attendees often refer to it 
as a reunion.95 These events included aviators from the Navy and the Marine Corps along 
with talks on other aviation related topics. The planners eventually decided on Las Vegas 
as the permanent location for the symposium.96  
The Tailhook sex scandal happened only months after the conclusion of 
Operation Desert Storm in which nearly 100 sexual assaults occurred. The third floor of 
the hotel aviation squadrons had over twenty designated suites, which the pilots utilized 
for social gatherings having fun and drinking alcohol.97 Over course of the weekend, 
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those attending the symposium spent more than $35,000 on alcohol.98 With the 
consumption of alcohol, the behavior of some of the attendees began to descend into the 
criminal realm.99  
During the symposium there were various inappropriate acts committed. For 
example, some of the men formed what they called the gauntlet, which referred to an 
activity that occurs on the third floor the with male aviators lining up on both sides of the 
wall waiting for women to walk by. As the ladies walked past the men groped, pinched, 
or grabbed them. Some of the women willfully participated and others did not.100 
Captain Ludwig declared that the most serious criminal offense occurred during 
the gauntlet, he received five separate assault claims from young women who were not 
even part of the Tailhook event. The women’s complaint ranged from having drinks 
thrown on them to sexual molestation. The most disturbing thing about the gauntlet was 
when an inebriated under aged young woman had her cloths taken off by service-
member.101 
 On September 7, 1991, Lieutenant Paula Coughlin unwittingly walked into the 
gauntlet after exiting the elevator. Three men seized her, groped her and removed her 
underwear. Lieutenant Coughlin managed to flee from her assailants. She reported the 
occurrence to her senior officer, Rear Admiral John B. Snyder, the following day. She 
went back to Rear Admiral Snyder after not receiving a response. She then sent a letter to 
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Snyder’s superior Vice Admiral Dunleavy, who immediately ordered an investigation 
upon receiving her letter. An entire month elapsed between the time she made her initial 
complaint and the time the investigate months on commenced. Although other offenses 
occurred the gauntlet was by far the worst.102 
In 1992, 140 officers received punitive actions for their role in the Tailhook 
Incident. The military judicial system charged none of the officer with sexual assault. Lt. 
Coughlin’s attackers had all charges dropped against them due to lack of evidence. The 
fact that the military justice system brought no charges against any of the officers served 
as an indication of the extent to which the masculine dominated culture influence justice. 
The Navy’s lack of resolve to punish the Tailhook sexual predators clearly illustrated that 
the leadership did not perceive the seriousness of the offenses, this lack of action served 
only to embolden the perpetrators and provide them with the opportunities to commit 
future assaults. Additionally, this general breakdown of trust created a hostile work 
environment which adversely effected military readiness.   
After a formal investigation of the incidents at the Tailhook symposium, Vice 
Admiral Dunleavy, Rear Admiral Flagg, and Rear Admiral Mixson received letters of 
censure for their inaction.  Vice Admiral Dunleavy told the DoD Inspector General Davis 
that he knew of the criminal activities that went on in the Gauntlet, in addition to the 
prostitution, but did not act to prevent it.103 Admiral Dunleavy’s failure to take 
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appropriate action created an environment that facilitated the sexual assaults and 
indicated a degree of tolerance on his part that put those attending the convention at risk.   
The response that Lt. Coughlin received from Rear Admiral Snyder and the 
actions of the other admirals indicated that to some degree they approved of the criminal 
behavior at Tailhook Symposium through their silence or inaction. Snyder’s failure to 
address Coughlin’s concerns revealed that sexual harassment and sexual assault as a 
problem deeply seated in military culture.104 The momentous leadership failure in 
addressing the Tailhook scandal indicates an acceptance of the rape/sexual assault 
culture.105  
The Murder of Allen Schindler 
Allen Schindler, a gay sailor from Chicago Heights, Illinois, served on the 
amphibious assault ship USS Beleau Wood in Nagasaki as a radioman. In the months of 
March-April 1992, Schindler made numerous complaints to his chain of command of 
homophobic harassment. Schindler reported that his fellow shipmates constantly 
subjected him to frequent unfriendly acts that included derogatory and threatening 
comments. For example on one occasion someone glued his wall locker shut.106 In 
response to these hostilities, Schindler initiated separation from the Navy; however, his 
superiors directed him to continue on ship until the finalization of the process. Schindler 
complied with the orders in spite of the risk. 
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After leaving San Diego for the destination of Sasebo, the USS Belleau Wood 
stopped at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. While traveling to Japan, Schindler used secure lines to 
send prank message "2-Q-T-2-B-S-T-R-8" (too cute to be straight) that reached a large 
portion of the Pacific Fleet. Schindler received what is known as captain's mast (non-
judicial hearing in Navy and Marine Corps) for the unauthorized radio transmission. He 
requested a closed hearing, but his chain of command ignored his request and more than 
two hundred people attended.107 Schindler received a punishment which restricted him to 
the ship that lasted until a few weeks after arriving at Sasebo. 
On October 27, 1992, Navy Airman Apprentice Terry M. Helvey and Navy 
Airman Charles Vins followed Schindler into a public toilet situated in a recreational area 
in Sasebo, Nagasaki, with criminal intentions. Without warning Helvet, viciously 
attacked the unsuspecting Schindler as he utilized the urinal in the facility. Helvey 
mercilessly stomped Schindler and inflicted fatal injuries to the victim’s body (head and 
torso area) that left sneaker tread marks. Schindler sustained abrasions, contusions, and 
lacerations of the forehead, lungs, liver, eyes, nose, lips, neck, trachea, penis and other 
areas.108 Helvey and Vins left Schindler on the restroom floor. The Shore Patrol and 
Keith Sims, who witnessed the attack moved Schindler's body to the Albuquerque 
Bridge.109 Helvey’s attack left Schindler so badly disfigured that his family could only 
identify him by a tattoo located on his arm.110 
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During the trial Helvey said, "I did not attack him because he was 
homosexual."111 Navy investigator Kennon F. Pivette presented evidence from the 
interrogation which repudiated Helvey’s claim. Privette told the court ,"He said he hated 
homosexuals. He was disgusted by them.”112 In regards to killing Schindler, Privette cited 
Helvey as saying: "I don't regret it. I'd do it again. ... He deserved it."113 
The original charge the prosecutors sought carried the death penalty, but, the court 
allowed Helvey to cut a deal in exchange for a guilty plea to  "inflicting great bodily 
harm," for which the maximum possible penalty is life imprisonment.114 
The court-martial panel handed Helvey a murder conviction and sentenced him to 
life in prison. The Navy reassigned Captain Douglas J. Bradt, the commanding officer 
who failed to report the incident, to shore duty in Florida. Legal statute grants Helvey an 
annual clemency hearing. Initially, incarcerated at the United States Disciplinary 
Barracks, but transferred to FCI Greenville in Illinois in 2015, Helvey continues to serve 
out his prison term. Prosecutors accepted a deal which permitted Helvey's accomplice, 
Charles Vins, to plead guilty to the three lesser charges and testify against Helvey. Vins 
received seventy-eight days confinement and general discharge from the Navy.  
The murder of Allen Schindler revealed that the toxic masculinity that dominated 
US Armed Force allowed homophobia to persist unchecked. The Navy only responded 
anti-gay harassment when it manifested itself in the most extreme form. Schindler’s 
                                                 
111 Ibid., 261 






leaders made next to no effort to ensure his physical and emotional well-being. 
Schindler’s chain of command failed to take appropriate actions regarding his complain 
of homophobic harassment. The inaction of Schindler’s leadership allowed a climate of 
hate to persist that nurtured toxic masculinity amongst the ship and crew USS Belleau 
Wood that ultimately ended in murder.  
Lawmakers Fight Over Lifting the Ban on LGBTQ+ Openly Serving 
On October 28, 1991, at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University, students asked then presidential candidate William Clinton, would he issue an 
executive order to repeal the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the military? Clinton 
expressed his opposition to the Armed Forces’ ban, “I think people who are gay should 
be expected to work, and should be given the opportunity to serve their country.”115 
During his 1992 Presidential campaign Clinton promised to end the military’s ban on 
homosexuality.116  
After assuming office, Clinton’s proposal encountered intense opposition from 
many lawmakers in the US Congress. At first, Clinton planned to repeal the ban on 
LGBTQ+ individuals serving in the armed forces within two weeks of assuming the 
Presidency. Formidable resistance in the House and the Senate forced him to take another 
course of action. The Clinton administration did not draw up an executive order until July 
15, 1992, During these six months, Congressional hearings in both the House of 
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Representatives debated the issue of  LGBTQ+ serving in the military.117 In these 
inquiries related to LGBTQ+ service, congressional members raised concerns regarding 
the fiscal impact of AIDS and heterosexual and homosexual cadets housed together at 
service academies. In these hearings, two senior ranking military retirees gave 
testimonies in resistance to lifting the ban on LGBTQ+ service, they believed the 
proposed policy would negatively impact the morale of the Armed Forces. Retired US 
Army General Frederick Kroesen’s stated in his testimony that the “overall ability of the 
military to accomplish its mission would be compromised,” and retired US Navy Admiral 
Thomas Moorer testified that he regarded lifting the ban on homosexuals as “an effort in 
effect to downgrade and demean and break down the whole structure of our military 
forces.”118  
Military sociologist Charles Moskos devised the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” 
(DADT) policy as a compromise between the Clinton administration and military 
leadership. During the development of DADT, the House and Senate established that 
homosexual status differed from a homosexual act. They deemed the former as less 
punishable than the latter. Nevertheless, the notion of a policy change that allowed gays 
and lesbians to serve openly, disturbed many within the legislature. The Senate put 
forward 107 recommended amendments to the DADT legislation. The House proposed a 
revision that removed the section of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that forbade the 
Department of Defense questioning recruits about their sexual orientation or inclination 
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to partake in homosexual acts; however, efforts to make this modification to the proposed 
legislation failed by a vote of 291-144.119   
Proponents and opponents of repealing the ban on gays and lesbians serving in the 
Armed Forces reached a compromise and passed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) 
Policy of the United States Military by a vote 92-7 in the Senate and 268-162 in the 
House. On September 30, 1993, President Clinton signed Public-Law 103-160, with the 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in Section 571, codified at 10 United States Code 654. 
Nearly three months later, on December 21, 1993, DADT became military law when the 
Department of Defense issued the 1993 Department of Defense Directive 1304.26. This 
order declared that those seeking to serve in the United States Armed Forces “shall not be 
asked or required to reveal whether they are heterosexual, homosexual or bisexual [. . .] 
or required to reveal whether they have engaged in homosexual conduct.” DADT went 
into effect on February 28, 1994. 
At the time of its ratification in 1993, lawmakers regarded “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” as a middle ground between those in favor of repealing the ban on homosexuals and 
those who supported its continuance. The guidelines of this policy stipulated that gays 
and lesbians could secretly serve in the Armed Forces. It also prohibited service members 
from asking questions and telling one another about their sexual orientation.120 DADT 
did not invalidate Defense Directive 1332.14, which allowed discharges on the grounds 
of homosexuality, but it made separations from the services on these basis more difficult 
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and obliged military leaders to end investigations that targeted service members for their 
sexual orientation or personal sexual activities. No longer could military authorities 
pursue discharges based “homosexual proclivities.” 121 The originators of DADT 
intended for it to serve as a compromise between President Clinton and the Congress; 
however, it eventually developed into a transitional law, that paved the way for the 
Obama administration to repeal of the military’s ban on LGBTQ+ openly serving in 
2010.122  
Presidential candidate William J. Clinton launched his campaign promising to lift 
the ban of gays and lesbians serving in the armed forces, however after assuming office 
he encountered opposition in congress and from the military top brass. None of those 
who opposed the President offered any scientific based fact on how allow gays and 
lesbians to serve would downgrade or demean force; they only offered vague warnings 
that reflected their homophobia. Eventually, both sides reached a compromise that 
became known as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.” DADT managed to pass both the House and 
the Senate. Despite falling short of what the President promised, DADT served as an 
inadequate transitional policy that did little to address the source of anti-gay sentiments, 
toxic masculinity, which is the common cause of the harassment and violence directed 
against both LGBTQ+ and women. DADT and the sexual assault and sexual harassment 
prevention policies failed to remove toxic masculinity from the military’s culture. Despite 
these new guidelines, hostile attitudes and gendered violence against LGBTQ+ and 
                                                 






women continued in the years that followed. Subsequentially, the following incidents 
proved that the updated policies could not protect fellow services members or civilians. 
The 1995 Okinawa Rape Incident   
On September 4, 1995, three US servicemembers stationed at Camp Hansen on 
the island of Okinawa collaborated in the rape and abduction of a 12-year-old Japanese 
girl. U.S Navy Seaman Marcus Gill, along with US Marines Rodrico Harp and Kendrick 
Ledet, snatched the young girl into a rented a vehicle and used duct-taped to bound her 
hands and cover her mouth and eyes. Gill and Harp raped the girl, but Ledet maintained 
he only feigned sexual assault due to his fear of Gill.123 The incident strained US and 
Japanese relations and provoked the debate, should US forces remain in a post-Cold War 
Japan. A Japanese court tried and convicted the offenders under Japanese law, according 
to the US–Japan Status of Forces Agreement. 124 
 All three men pleaded guilty to the charges against them and their trial ended on 
March 1996. The court convicted Gill of the rape and Harp and Ledet of conspiracy. 
Prosecutors pushed for the maximum punishment of ten years in prison, however the 
judge sentenced Gill and Harp to seven years' and Ledet to a lightly shorter sentence of 
six and a half years. In addition to this, relatives of the perpetrators followed a common 
Japanese custom and paid "reparation money" to the victim’s family. In 2003, the three 
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men completed their prison sentences in Japan and received other than honorable 
discharge from the service.  
In 2006, Ledet, who insisted that he did not rape the Okinawan girl committed 
suicide after what seemed like a murder–suicide in the United States. Ledet apparently 
took his life after he sexually assaulted and murdered a former coworker and Kennesaw 
State University student, Lauren Cooper, in her third floor apartment. According to 
officials, he sexually assaulted, and strangled Cooper and then used a knife to slice open 
arteries in the elbow area.125 
There is no way to know for sure whether Ledet raped the Okinawan girl or not. 
Details from his trial established that he assisted in the abduction to commit the sexual 
assault. The suicide-murder revealed that Ledet did not get the help he needed after 
completing his prison sentence. Research indicates that sex offending is usually 
reoccurring and not impulsive. Studies show that forty-five percent of untreated sex 
offenders re-offend.126 The US military Ledet shortly after his release from a Japanese 
prison and failed to provide him with services necessary reintegrate him back into 
society. 
The Okinawan sexual assault revealed how gendered violence committed by 
service-members transcends the Armed Forces. Gill, Harp, and Ledet kidnapped a young 
girl, from the host nation of Japan. Seaman Gill sexually assaulted the girl while the other 
two assisted him. The action of the service-men caused unimaginable psychological and 
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physical trauma to the victim as well as placed a severe strain of the relationship between 
the United States and its close ally Japan. This overseas with conflicting jurisdiction 
created an illusion of lawlessness that provided the perfect opportunity for these men to 
express their contempt for women. Ledet’s post-military murder suicide also shows that 






















Chapter 4. Leadership and Policy Failures, 1996-2003 
The Game: The Aberdeen Proving Grounds Scandal 
 In the United States, Armed Forces there exists a power imbalance between non-
trainees and trainees. To prevent conduct that would compromise the good order and 
discipline, the military established guidelines to avoid interactions not required by the 
training mission. This power differential gives greater influence to the trainer and places 
limitations on the trainees’ power to consent, which makes female recruits susceptible to 
sexual assault or sexual exploitation. This power differential may make the new recruit 
feel compelled to follow the orders of a superior even if they are illegal.   
As mentioned earlier many of the ordinance military occupational specialties 
(MOS) opened up to women after the draft ended in the 1970s. Aberdeen Proving 
Ground’s Ordnance Center (APG) in Maryland, until 2010 was one of the many locations 
where new recruits conduct their training on their chosen military occupation.127 As a 
result, many women conduct their advanced individual training there.  
In September 1996, a woman conducting her advanced individual training at the 
Aberdeen Proving Ground filed a sexual misconduct complaint against one of her 
trainers. Two month later in November thirty-four women stated that they experienced 
rape, sexual assault or sexual harassment at Aberdeen. In this same month the army set 
up a sexual assault hotline, it received over 6,000 calls. The call center not only received 
complaints from APG, but it also fielded calls from other Army installations around the 
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country, compelling Army officials to broaden their investigation to include other 
bases.128  
On November 21, 1996, the Secretary of the Army Togo West established the 
Secretary of the Army’s Senior Review Panel, a military and civilian board which 
consisted of forty personnel. Secretary West charged the panel with reviewing existing 
Army policies regarding sexual harassment and sexual assault. The panel also 
investigated how the chain of command dealt with claims of sexual assault and 
recommended future guidelines in addressing the issue of sexual harassment.129 
The inquiry included interviews, surveys and a focus group. Investigators talked 
to 7,401 soldiers and 808 leaders, surveyed 22,952 soldiers, and established a focus group 
that consisted of 1,007 civilian employees.130 The investigation team noticed in the 
surveys, focus groups, and interviews the frequent mentioning of something called “The 
Game.” Investigators discovered that Captain (Cpt.) Derrick Robertson, Staff Sergeant 
(Ssg.) Delmar Simpson and Sergeant First Class (Sfc.) Tony Cross established this so-
called “Game” or “GAM A La Military,” in which the participants competing against one 
another in order to see which one could have sexual intercourse with the most trainees.  
Each partaker maintained a record of their lecherous activities, in order to win the game. 
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According to the rules, whoever had the most names on their list was the winner. It 
unknown if there was a prize given or just simple bragging rights.131 
Military officials charged and convicted those who took part in the sex abuse. 
Captain Robertson, Staff Sergeant Robinson, and Sergeant. Simpson served time in 
prison. Simpson got the longest sentence of 25 years with Captain Robertson getting four 
months and Staff Sergeant Robinson getting six months.  
The Aberdeen Proving Grounds Scandal it only revealed the sexual misconduct 
on there, but it exposed similar occurrence other military bases. The investigation 
revealed that sexual harassment, sexual assault, and fraternization occurred on US 
Military bases around the world; it confirmed the existence of rape culture within the 
armed forces. The scandal brought attention to the culture of sexual assault and rape that 
existed in the military that viewed woman as nothing more than objects for sexual 
recreation. 
Sergeant Major of the Army Accused of Sexual Misconduct 
On June 30, 1995, at the Pentagon, Gene C. McKinney became the first African 
American to hold the United States Army’s highest enlisted position when he took the 
oath of office to serve as the Sergeant Major of the Army (SMA). In accordance with the 
duties inherent in his position, SMA McKinney primarily served as an advisor to the 
Army’s Chief of Staff, General Reimer and the welfare of soldiers and their families. 





McKinney frequently visited soldiers in their areas of operation and provided Reimer 
with a detailed summary what he observed.132 
In late 1996, reports of alleged sexual abuse of female recruits by drill instructors 
and cadre personnel at Army training centers emerged. In response to the claims, 
Secretary of the Army Togo West vowed to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
Initial Entry Training program. Secretary West established an advisory panel and 
designated McKinney to serve as a Task Force member. As the sex abuse scandals 
continued to unfold, McKinney conducted a town hall meeting at one of the locations 
where many sexual abuse reports surfaced, the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. 
At this gathering, McKinney addressed close to 1,400 soldiers, including drill instructors, 
senior NCOs, and trainees. In the course of his two-day visit, he observed that soldiers on 
the installation remained in good spirits despite their frustration at the negative attention 
from the media.  In his response to a question presented to him during the session 
McKinney stated that “the system we have works…but if soldiers want to fix the 
problem, they must come forth—not only for themselves, but for those who will come 
after.”133 He presumed that most soldiers believed in the Army’s determination and 
capability to take the right course of action regarding the allegations.  
At some stage of the task force’s investigation, an accusation against McKinney 
surfaced. In February 1997, a former aide, Sergeant Major Brenda L. Hoster claimed 
McKinney made sexual advances towards her in a Honolulu hotel room in 1996. Hoster 
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reasoned that McKinney’s actions rendered him unfit to serve on any sexual misconduct 
investigation panel. A week following the emergence of the accusations, congressional 
leaders pressured General Reimer to act. The negative attention that McKinney received 
made it increasingly difficult for him to perform his duties as Sergeant Major of the 
Army. Reimer’s decision to suspend McKinney rested firmly upon what best served the 
mutual interest of the accused and the institution.134  
General Reimer provided McKinney with an office to work out of in Fort Myer, 
Virginia. The suspension from his SMA responsibilities afforded McKinney the time he 
needed work with his legal team. The Army initiated Article 32 proceedings, which is the 
military equivalent of a grand jury.  During the twenty-seven-day probe into sexual 
misconduct allegations and in the course of that, five more service-women made claims 
against McKinney. The Article 32 panel found enough evidence to court martial 
McKinney with nineteen total charges that included eighteen sexual misconduct and one 
obstructing justice indictments. If convicted of all charges, McKinney would have 
received fifty-five years in prison and a dishonorable discharge. The lone charge of 
obstructing justice by itself carried a maximum five years prison sentence and a 
dishonorable discharge.135 McKinney’s court martial resulted in his permanent removal 
from the position of Sergeant Major of the Army and reassignment to the Military 
District of Washington.  
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The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
McKinney’s attorney Charles Gittens levied allegations of racial bias against the Army’s 
Criminal Investigation Division (CID). They claimed that (CID) targeted McKinney and 
the instructors at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds for charges that white offenders 
generally get reprimanded. Gittens and the NAACP pointed out that all the accused in the 
Aberdeen Proving grounds scandal were African-American.136  
On March 17, 1998, at the conclusion of a five week trial a military panel of eight 
senior-ranking soldiers acquitted McKinney of all eighteen counts sexual misconduct and 
convicted him only of obstructing justice for encouraging the witness to make a false 
statement.137 A recorded phone conversation with Staff Sergeant. Christine M. Fetrow 
served as the key evidence used to convict McKinney. The tape revealed that McKinney 
attempted to persuade Fetrow to change her story and tell Army investigators, they just 
talked about professional development. Fetrow stated under oath that the SMA forcefully 
took hold of her, secured the door and sexually propositioned her.138 
Prosecutors pursued a punishment of six months imprisonment and a grade 
reduction to the lowest enlisted rank of private; however, McKinney received a much 
lighter sentence. The court demoted McKinney to Master Sergeant (E-8), reprimanded 
him and permitted him to retire. The rank/grade reduction supposedly lowered McKinney 
monthly annuity from 3,260 to 2,385, but in reality, this did not happen. The United 
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States Code allowed members of the armed forces in a senior enlisted position to collect 
their pension based on the highest rate attained. This allowed McKinney to receive the 
retirement pay rate of a Sergeant Major of the Army.139 
The National Women's Law Center's founder Nancy Duff Campbell expressed 
that the verdict did not surprise her. Campbell, a lawyer who specializes in women's law 
whose legal successes include the famous Supreme Court case Califano v. Westcott, 
1979, which established the eligibility of unemployed mothers of two-parent families to 
receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits.140 Campbell hoped 
this type of jury decision did not represent the norm in the armed forces. She pointed out 
that both the verdict and sentence conveyed that the system does not work for them. 
Campbell concluded that the outcome of McKinney’s trial further discouraged victims 
from making the difficult decision to file complaints against sexual predators within the 
ranks.141 
Prior to his sentencing, McKinney took the witness stand and asked the members 
of the court martial panel to take into consideration his twenty-nine years of military 
service and let him retire "with some form of honor."142 
Attorney Charles W. Gittins established his defense on the credential that enabled 
McKinney to attain the Army‘s highest enlisted position and discredit the accusers. 
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Gittins focused on McKinney’s exceptional service record of twenty-eight years that 
included a tour in Vietnam. The testimony of officers and enlisted personnel reinforced 
McKinney’s reputation for honesty and integrity. Gittins contended that the alleged 
victims lied in retaliation against a strict and demanding leader like the McKinney, or due 
to personal issues, such as problems with male authority figures. Gittins declared, "We 
demonstrated, I believe conclusively . . . that the women were liars, cheats and frauds. 
We were left with an obstruction-of-justice charge that the government essentially 
manufactured."143 Gittins also mentioned that McKinney filed a libel suit against initial 
accuser retired Army Sergeant. Major Brenda L. Hoster for $1.5-million for damages that 
included compensation for possible lost retirement annuities.144 
The outcome of the trial disappointed McKinney's accusers, who complained that 
the one conviction and its sentence rendered the court-trial meaningless.  The alleged 
victims felt that the system failed them. Sergeant. Roy stated, "What I sacrificed wasn't 
worth [just] one guilty verdict." Another female witness, Navy Petty Officer Johnna M. 
Vinson, disclosed that in response to her claim that her friends withdrew from her and 
unequivocally expressed they sided in opposition to her.145  
Actions of Gene McKinney and the reaction of the United States Army caused 
considerable damage to the credibility of the military criminal justice system. McKinney 
made history when he became the first African-American to achieve the position of 
Sergeant Major of the Army, however six allegations of sexual misconduct by women 







who worked under him would overshadow this milestone. McKinney’s alleged victims 
risked and/or lost their careers in filing their claims. During the investigation, the 
character of the victims came under attack and the McKinney’s defense attempted to 
discredit the women. The Army court-martial panel only convicted McKinney of 
obstructing justice and dismissed all charges sexual misconduct. Although, he received a 
grade reduction, McKinney retired with his pensions based on the highest position he 
held, Sergeant Major of the Army.146 Reporting sexual abuse is a necessary step 
removing sex offenders from the military. The outcome of the court-martial of Sergeant 
Major of the Army McKinney served only to discourage future victims from reporting.  
As a high ranking official in the United States Army, Sergeant Major of the Army 
McKinney leadership failure undermined the authority of his position. As a result of his 
inappropriate actions and the relatively mild punishment he receive, left other service 
members distrustful of their leaders. This lack of trust discouraged some servicemembers 
a not to report sexual harassment and sexual assault. In a similar manner the following 
case illustrates that hostile environments are the direct or indirect results of leadership 
failures. 
The Murder of Barry Winchell 
In 1998, Private First Class. Barry Winchell was a United States Army infantry 
soldier, assigned to Delta Company, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne. 
Winchell’s murder at the hands fellow soldier, Calvin Glover in July 6, 1999, became a 
focal point in the armed forces” ongoing debate regarding its "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" 
                                                 





policy, which prohibited US military gays, bisexuals, and lesbians openly expressing 
their sexual orientation.147 
In March 1999, Specialist Justin Fisher returned talking incessantly about his 
Saturday night adventure at a gay nightclub in Nashville, which is approximately a one 
hour's drive from Fort Campbell. Fisher told fellow soldiers about his experience at an 
establishment that highlighted trans entertainers called the “Connection.” Fisher 
explained that he saw a mind-blowing "girl" dressed in a pink negligee, a thong, and go-
go boots lip-syncing to a Madonna song. This performer enthralled Fisher to the point 
that he wanted to return. The following night, Fisher, Winchell and a few others soldiers 
went to “The Connection.” There they met a twenty-eight-year-old United States Navy 
Gulf War Veteran and trans woman nightclub performer named Calpernia Addams. 
Addams remembers meeting Winchell, Fisher, and some other soldiers at the 
“Connection” on a Sunday night.  She observed that they hooted and hollered every time 
she came out onstage. On that night Addams met Fisher, but did not really notice the 
quiet Winchell. Addams observed that Fisher never made eye contact with her, she 
sensed that his attraction to her made him feel uneasy.148 The following weekend, the 
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soldiers came the club again, and afterward met with the showgirls at an after-hours 
club.149 
The following day, Fisher told his supervisor that an individual in the company 
engaged in intimate act with another man, but he refused to give up a name. Fisher 
explained to Sergeant Kleifgen and Sergeant Dubielak that he went to gay nightclub in 
Nashville to find a fellow soldier in order to give him a ride back to the installation, and 
saw that individual performing oral sex on another man. Around the company, Fisher 
narrated different versions of the story to others. In one of his accounts, Fisher claimed he 
dropped Winchell off at a gay social establishment and when he returned he caught 
Winchell engaging oral sex on a man.150 
Fisher’s fabricated accounts may reflect his actions at the nightclub in Nashville. 
Soldiers in the company noticed that Fisher began to harass Winchell in front of others 
and seemed to take pleasure in it. Fisher said things like "what it was like to suck 
cock."151 After further inquiry, Kleifgen and Dubielak concluded that Barry Winchell was 
the soldier Fisher supposedly saw in the nightclub. When sergeants asked Fisher to 
confirm the identity of the service member, he simply smiled. Fisher conveniently failed 
to disclose to the two noncommissioned officers’ details of his own behavior. Fisher 
never told his leadership that he went to the gay club with Winchell, made out with a 
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trans performer on a street corner in downtown Nashville, liked to dress in women’s 
lingerie, and he once started stroking Winchell while he slept.152  
When Winchell and Addams began dating, they took measures to ensure their 
relationship never conflicted with Winchell’s military duties. He only met Addams off-
duty and off post. Winchell drove to Nashville on weekends and spent time with Addams 
in her dressing room as opposed to hanging out in the barracks and drinking with the 
guys in his company. Winchell and Addams held hands in public, went to movies and did 
other things that couples do, but made sure to say their goodbyes away from the base.153 
Eventually something that began as discord between two individuals swiftly 
spread throughout the unit. Fisher's demeaning comments reached the entirety of what 
made up Delta Company, from the lowest ranking private to some of the senior 
noncommissioned officers. "Pretty much everyone called him derogatory names,"154 said 
platoon Sergeant. Michael Kleifgen. "They called him a faggot, I would say, on a daily 
basis."155 One day, Kleifgen decided to question Winchell regarding his sexual 
orientation. Kleifgen asked Winchell if he was gay. Winchell replied no and Kleifgen 
pursued his inquiry no further. The sergeant stated that he left it at that because of the 
military’s “Don't ask, don't tell" policy. Winchell did eventually make a complaint to his 
company commander Cpt. Daniel Rouse of the harassment. Rouse simply ordered the 
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troops to cut it out, but failed to do a follow-up to ensure that members of the unit 
stopped making demeaning comments to Winchell.156 
Kleifgen commented that in all-male infantry units like Delta Company, this type 
of vulgarity commonly occurs. He saw no harm in it until he heard the company’s 1sg., 
Roger Seacrest say in reference to Winchell, "The faggot has got a fucking drinking 
problem, and I'm going to do something about it."157  First Segeant. Seacrest’s comments 
prompted Kleifgen to bring the matter to the company commander and file a complaint 
with the post's inspector general. Kleifgen stated that the leadership made light of the 
formal complaint and essentially did nothing.158 
On July 3, 1999, Winchell decided to join the other soldiers, who made no plan 
during the four-day weekend, at the picnic table area outside of the Delta Company 
barracks. The off-duty warriors threw a keg party in which they told stories, played 
whiffle ball, and blasted their music from a stereo.159  A young Private Second Class 
named Calvin Glover, who arrived at the unit in March, attempted to impress everyone 
by boasting about his macho toughness. As Glover told stories about his pre-military 
criminal deed, Fisher encouraged him to tell more. Glover told a tale about his five 
consecutive days of methamphetamines use and bank robbery. When he thought people 
ignored him, he threw beer bottles and swung baseball bats to get their attention.160 
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After a while, Winchell told Glover to “take [his] drunk, cherry ass to bed.”161 A 
drunken and enraged Glover jumped to Winchell. Winchell calmly remained in his seat, 
smoking his cigarette. Repeatedly, Glover tried to knock Winchell’s the beer from his 
hand. In a matter of seconds, Winchell knocked Glover to the ground with three to four 
punches and then subdued him162 
The fight upset Winchell and he cried as he attempted to make peace with Glover. 
He asked Glover "It's cool, right?" Winchell tried to shake hands with Glover and offered 
him some Southern Comfort and another beer. In spite of Winchell’s effort, Fisher made 
it a point to remind Glover of how he just ass kicked. "It's not cool!" Glover said. "I could 
fucking kill you. A faggot cannot kick my ass."163 
The following day, Fisher continued to taunt Glover over losing a fist fight to a 
“faggot.” Fisher and Glover passed time in a manner that many soldier do during 
downtime drink beer. While drinking they conversed with one another as the “Psycho” 
soundtrack played. Fisher continuously harassed Glover about losing the physical 
altercation to a “faggot.” Glover expressed that he wanted to “fuck up” Winchell, to 
which Fisher replied “go for it.”164 Fisher and Glover discussed their issues with 
Winchell, who slept on a cot outside. Fisher’s feeling towards his roommate stemmed 
primarily from a hatred and a burning desire to inflict suffering upon him. In Glover, 
Fisher found a means to express his animosity toward Winchell, especially when Glover 
                                                 







grabs a baseball bat and starts mumbling. Fisher goaded and humiliated Glover for close 
to fifteen hours because of a physical confrontation that took place the previous night.165  
On July 5, 1999, sometime between 2:00-3:00 A.M., Calvin Glover repeatedly 
struck a sleeping Barry Winchell with a Louisville Slugger baseball bat in an attack 
fueled by the instigation of Specialist Justin Fisher in a hyper-masculine environment. 
Glover inflicted fatal injuries on Winchell as he slept on a cot in the hallway in the Delta 
Company Barracks.166 Afterwards, he returned the bat to Fisher, who washed the blood 
off of the bat and said "We're family now” and “this stays in the family."167 Winchell 
died the following day at Vanderbilt University Medical Center from blunt force trauma 
to the left side of his head and neck.168 
The Army's initial account neglected to mention several important factors related 
to the murder. Officials provided an uncomplicated explanation of the murder, calling 
Winchell's death the result of "an altercation between soldiers."169 The Army did not 
disclose that the attack happened while Winchell slept on his cot, nor did they tell the 
public that Winchell’s superiors and fellow soldiers harassed and ostracized him because 
they believed he was gay.170  
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In court, Army prosecutor Captain Gregg Engler argued that Glover's humiliation 
at losing a fight to a gay man prompted the attack. Glover admitted that he was extremely 
drunk during the incident. Major David Robertson, Glover's defense attorney, laid the 
responsibility on Fisher's influence, pointing out that Fisher took advantage of an 
opportunity to provoke an easily influenced soldier into carrying out his violent fantasies 
of attacking Winchell. Robertson portrayed Fisher as a scheming troublemaker, as a cold 
calculating homophobe who detested Winchell, exploiting Glover as his weapon.171 
Army officials also avoided addressing other complex aspects of the incident. 
Army spokeswoman Major Pamela Hart stated that if Winchell felt unsafe, he could 
make a complaint to his chain of command or to the installations Equal Opportunity 
Office. Army prosecutor Captain Gregg Engler, Fisher's civilian attorney Michael Love, 
and military judge Colonel Kenneth Pangburn all attempted to evade questions exploring 
sexuality and masculinity. Dr. Keith Caruso, a forensic psychiatrist, did not testify as to 
whether or not Fisher was gay, he only identified Fisher as “sexually confused” and 
curious. Caruso noted that since age fourteen, Fisher secretly wore women's 
undergarments.172 
In December 2000, a military court martial sentenced Calvin Glover to life in 
prison for the murder of Barry Winchell. Eleven months earlier, Justin Fisher managed to 
avoid a trial for accessory to murder by pleading guilty to the charges of obstruction of 
justice, making false statements and giving a minor alcohol.173 Fisher received a twelve-
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and-a-half-year sentence for his crimes. The military justice system sentenced both men 
to serve their confinement at Fort Leavenworth Military Prison, in Kansas.174  
Winchell's murder led to a reevaluation of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy and 
an investigation of the command climate on Fort Campbell. Defense Secretary William S. 
Cohen called for a review of DADT and ordered that the Department of Defense conduct 
mandatory training to prevent anti-gay harassment. Fort Campbell's installation 
commander Major General Robert T. Clark ordered an investigation to determine if 
officers disregarded complaints related to Private First Class Winchell's harassment.175  
In 2000, the Army's Inspector General Lieutenant General Michael W. Ackerman 
issued a report of the command climate at Fort Campbell. The Inspector General rated the 
command climate as good; however, he determined that an abusive First Sergeant headed 
Winchell's company. Ackerman also reported that some of the other soldier assigned to 
Delta Company harbored anti-gay/homophobic attitudes. Despite the murder of Winchell, 
officials concluded that the levels of homophobia within the 101st Airborne Division did 
not reach what they considered unacceptable levels, and cleared all officers of any 
improper actions.176 The investigation also revealed that units on the installation sang 
anti-gay cadences.  The Fort Campbell inquiry also discovered that many of the leaders 
did not understand the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. This indicates that the senior 
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leaders failed to ensure that the soldiers under their command received proper training 
concerning DADT. From 1999 to 2000 the number gay discharged at Fort Campbell 
jumped from seventeen to 161. In regards to the discharges, forty percent of the 
commanders on the installation expressed concerns about the soldier safety.177 
Not all of these confounding details came to light at either of the two court-
martial proceedings that occurred in January and December of 2000. Legal proceedings 
and to a greater degree military court-martials require a clear narrative without 
uncertainties or unclear motivations; however, the factors driving this specific event such 
as identity and sexuality, affection and attraction, desire and disdain present challenges 
when attempting to understand them. One thing that became evidently clear was that 
three young males with uncertainties regarding their sexuality enlisted in the army with 
the hopes of understanding their troubled lives. Instead they ended up in a hostile 
environment that did not tolerate their search for answers.178         
The murder of Barry Winchell exposed the inadequacies of the “Don’t Ask Don’t 
Tell” policy. Winchell endured relentless anti-gay harassment due to his relationship with 
Capernia Addams. Winchell’s leadership not only failed to look out for his wellbeing; 
some of them directly contributed to the toxic environment. Private Second Class Glover 
murdered Winchell because he felt that losing a fight to someone perceived as gay 
threatened his masculinity. Glover’s insecurities and the homophobic attitude that 
dominated Delta company made it easy for Fisher to manipulate him into committing a 
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violent act against Winchell. The atmosphere at Delta was one of extreme disdain for 
nonconformity to gender constructs. The death of Barry Winchell is a clear example of 
toxic masculinity resulting from the failure of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy.     
Air Force Academy Sexual Abuse Scandal 1993-2003 
On January 2, 2003, someone using the pseudonym “Renee Trundle” sent an 
email to the Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche, Senator Wayne Allard of 
Colorado, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of Colorado, and representatives of the 
media. The message alleged that a large number of sexual assaults occurred at the Air 
Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado.179 
After grasping what the letter asserted, the Secretary of the Air Force James G. 
Roche ordered the General Counsel of the Air Force to put together a group to assess 
complaints by cadets related to sexual assault that transpired at the Air Force Academy in 
Colorado. The complaints covered a time period of nearly ten years. In addition to this, 
Secretary Roche charged the DoD Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz with conducting 
a stand-alone probe into the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) handling 
of sexual assault incidents and to look into cadet complaints regarding accusations of the 
mismanagement of sexual assault cases. These complaints covered a period starting  in 
January 1993 and ending in February 2003.180 Tillie K. Fowler, the former US 
                                                 





Representative from Florida, at the request of the Department of Defense and Congress, 
oversaw a separate evaluation of the sexual assault crisis at the Air Force Academy.181  
Secretary Roche established the Working Group Concerning the Deterrence of 
and Response to Incidents of Sexual Assault at the US Air Force Academy. On June 17, 
2003, it publicized the report. The Working Group determined, based on the outcome of 
their probe that “no systemic acceptance of sexual assault at the Academy, no 
institutional avoidance of responsibility, or systemic maltreatment of cadets who report 
sexual assault” at the Air Force Academy.182 
Despite their deductions, the Working Group found discrepancies in the handling 
of sexual assault cases. They discovered that in some years the command focused on 
sexual assault and in others they placed less emphasis on sexual assault. The Working 
Group learned that following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the academy 
redirected its focus on security issues and neglected its sexual assault cases.183 
In 1996, the Air Force leaders established The Sexual Assault Services 
Committee at the Air Force Academy, to deal with sexual assault issues and policies at 
the Academy. The Working Group uncovered that from 2000-2002, this specialized 
committee met only five times. The Sexual Assault Services Committee, consequently, 
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failed to completely grasp the sexual assault troubles at the Academy and neglected to 
notify the command of the problems.184 
The Working Group discovered that within the Academy a culture existed in 
which sexist and sexualized comments made by cadets commonly occurred but could not 
establish a conclusive link joining this culture and the issue of sexual assault. The 
Working Group in their report talked about the problems of the consumption of alcohol 
beverages by underage cadet along with arrangement for housing female cadets. The 
Working Group recommended that the policies related to alcohol at the Academy played 
a role in the sexual assault problems and offered stricter punitive actions for underage 
drinking. Additionally, the report suggested changes in housing assignments. The coed 
environment that existed forced females to walk down hallways in robes and physical 
fitness apparel.185 
The Air Force Office of Special Investigation discovered that between the dates of 
January 7, 1993, and February 21, 2003, fifty-six cases of sexual assault allegedly 
occurred at the Air Force Academy.186 The allegations in these cases consisted of thirty-
one rapes, eighteen indecent assaults, four offenses against a child, two sodomy offenses, 
and one attempted rape. Investigators dropped three of the fifty-six total cases, following 
the victim’s withdrawal of their complaints. Of the fifty-three remaining cases, fifty-one 
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percent involved freshmen victims and assailants. While cases involving a freshman 
cadet and an upperclassman cadet accounted for only eleven percent (Schmitz, 2004a).187 
DoD Inspector General Joseph Schmitz examined the AFOSI probe. He 
commenced his assessment in March 2003. Schmitz discovered numerous mistakes in the 
preliminary inquiry of the fifty-six sexual assault cases. The shortcomings in the 
investigative procedures revealed that ten cases had missing steps in their inquiry. Three 
of them failed to use forensic science in their investigation even after a recommendation. 
In two cases, reports failed explain why investigator collected some evidence but did not 
sent them off for laboratory analysis.188 
Mistakes in the early investigation stage can have disastrous results in a sexual 
assault case. In the armed forces investigators represent and derive their authority from 
the chain of command and consequently they are duty bound to conduct a detailed 
investigation. Even though the failings in the investigation stage are worth taking note of 
due to the relationship of investigator to the chain of command, Schmitz’s conclusion 
pointed out that the shortcomings in the investigation procedures did not cause of the 
sexual assault problem at the Air Force Academy. 
DoD Inspector General Schmitz concluded that the sexual assault problem at the 
Air Force Academy stemmed from a ten-year failure of the chain of command ranging 
from 1993-2003. He mentioned that the leadership neglected to put into practice and 
supervise the changes required to modify a culture favorable to sexual assault.189 He 
                                                 
187 Ibid. 





stated many leaders in positions of authority could have been better role models, could 
have been more vigilant in inspecting those placed under their command, failed to guard 
and suppress sexual misconduct among cadets, whether or not prosecutable as specific 
crime, and failed to hold cadets accountable for such misconduct.190 
Shortly afterwards, former US Representative from Florida, Tillie K. Fowler led a 
separate review panel’s investigation into the allegations of sexual assault at the Air 
Force Academy. The seven members who made up this panel came from various 
backgrounds in the service academies, that included behavioral and psychological 
practices associated with the appropriate treatment for victims of sexual assault. This 
panel became the first of its type to review the allegations of sexual assault at the 
Academy.191 
The Panel to Review Sexual Assaults at the Air Force Academy found the 
Working Panel at fault for failing to evaluate the shortcomings of the leadership. Instead 
the Working Panel directed its attention only on the incidents of sexual assault. The panel 
suggested that one of possible reason for the failure of the Working Group to evaluate the 
leadership is that it tried to protect the chain of command from public condemnation. 
Additionally, the panel discovered that the leadership at the Academy received numerous 
warnings from various agencies telling them that the institution had a problem with 
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sexual assault but failed to take appropriate action.192 The working group made no 
mention of this in their report. 
The Panel exposed that the leaders at the Academy and other senior Air Force 
officials became aware of sexual assault problems at the Academy as early as 1993. From 
1993 to 2003 the Academy averaged 14 sexual assault allegations per year. The 
command at Air Force Academy neglected to uphold a reliable degree of oversight over 
the sexual assault problem and did not make a diligent effort to develop solutions for this 
issue.193 The Panel identified the leadership as the main problem in regards to sexual 
assault allegations. It identified five officers as contributing to the problems, Major 
General John R. Dallagher, Brigadier General Wagie, Brigadier General S. Taco Gilbert 
III, Colonel Robert D. Eskridge, and Colonel Laurie Slavec. According to the panel, these 
leaders failed in their responsibilities in addressing this issue of the anti-woman 
environment in the Academy. 
From 1999-2003, Major General John R. Dallagher served as interim 
superintendent of the Air Force Academy. The panel determined that as superintendent 
he shouldered the largest share of blame for the sexual assault problems at the Academy. 
He failed in executing his authority as a leader and did not respond accordingly to the 
sexual assault problem.194 
Brigadier General Wagie possessed the best understanding of the Academy’s the 
sexual assault response program and how it should work. As a result of his 
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perceptiveness, the Panel said that he had “considerable institutional knowledge of the 
nature and extent of the Academy’s sexual misconduct problems due to his 
responsibilities and lengthy tenure at the Academy spanning 16 years.”195 Brigadier 
General Wagie neglected to acknowledge and or undertake effectual courses of action to 
put a stop to the academy’s sexual assaults.196 
As the senior commander at the Air Force Academy, Brigadier General S. Taco 
Gilbert III held responsibility for the safety and well-being of the cadets under his 
command. This included safeguarding from sexual assault. His responsibilities required 
that upon assuming command, he received briefings on previous sexual assault 
incidences along with the sexual assault response and reporting procedures. In addition to 
this, his position held him responsible for the actions of subordinate commanders serving 
under him; this included the actions or inactions of Colonel Laurie Slavec. General 
Gilbert III informed the Panel that he intended to relieve Colonel Slavec from her 
leadership position, yet, in April 2003 he presented a merit medal award for her 
mentorship to those she commanded.197  
The leadership style of Colonel Laurie Slavec fostered an environment that 
discouraged cadets form making complaints. Her unsympathetic leadership instilled fear 
in the cadets she commanded. Cadets under Colonel Slavec’s command disclosed that the 
fear of repercussions made them apprehensive in reporting their sexual assaults. In an 
interview conducted by the Panel, Colonel Slavec expressed her ignorance of how the 
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Academy defined sexual assault. She mentioned that she held her own understanding of 
what she felt constituted “true rape.” According to Slavec’s definition, so-called true rape 
involved force. Colonel Slavec also claimed that she believed that a lot of women who 
reported rape at the Academy did so in order avoid charges related to consensual sex, 
such as adultery.198 
The Air Force Academy’s sexual assault scandal resulted in the relief of four Air 
Force officials that included Superintendent James G. Roche, his second in command, 
Brigadier General S. “Taco” Gilbert III, Vice Commandant Colonel Robert D. Eskridge 
and commander of cadet training Colonel Laurie S. Slavec.199 The reports focused on the 
command responses to sexual assault and related policies at the Academy and not 
individual cases. 
DoD Inspector General Schmitz and the Panel to Review Sexual Assaults at the 
Air Force Academy both came to the conclusion that the Air Force knew about the 
serious sexual assault problem at Academy for more than ten years. Notwithstanding the 
knowledge that he Air Force failed to carry out the required actions needed to resolve the 
problem. Schmitz, the Panel, and the Working Group observed inconsistencies in the 
oversight of sexual assault problems. A few of the oversight concerns involved the 
Sexual Assault Services Committee’s irregular meetings and the leadership turnover 
rate.200 
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Furthermore, the Panel, The Working Group, and DoD Inspector General Schmitz 
identified culture as a causative influence on the Academy sexual assaults. Cadets at the 
Air Force Academy recounted that the regularity of sexism and sexualized remarks 
occurred to the point of normalcy. According to a sexual assault survey given at the 
Academy one in every five cadets who took the survey responded that they felt that 
women did not belong in the Academy. In 1998, forty-one percent of female cadets 
reported sexual harassment by other cadets and sixty-three percent reported derogatory 
comments based on gender. Some the cadet squadron accepted crude behavior as norm 
and expected female cadet to put up with it. Another survey in 2001 indicated that forty-
five percent of feared reprisal from the faculty for reporting sexual harassment. 
Interviews conducted with the Academy leadership also revealed the frequent use of 
offensive gender-based comments when referring to females.201 The Panel and DoD 
Inspector General revealed that the failure of leadership at the Academy to change the 
culture at the institution, created an environment favorable to sexual assault.202 
The mindset of the command’s senior officers played a major role in the sexual 
assault troubles. Brigadier General S. “Taco” Gilbert III said, “For example, if I walk 
down a dark alley with hundred- dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it does not justify 
my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risk by doing what I did.”203 
Gilbert gave this response when questioned regarding the rape of female cadet following 
an evening in which she partook in drinking and strip poker. Colonel Slavec believed that 
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the women claiming to experience sexual assault at the Academy lied. Her 
responsibilities as a commander required that she report sexual assaults, but her harshness 
and mentality deterred sexual assault victims from reporting.204 
Following the Air Force Academy’s sexual assault incidents, numerous 
procedural changes went into effect for new cadets in 2004. The Secretary of the Air 
Force’s Agenda for Change sketched out 165 needed changes identified by Air Force 
officials. In 2004, the Air Force implemented 140 of 165 changes.205 One of the first 
changes created new reporting procedures sexual assault. These included the creation of a 
new sexual assault response team.206 In addition to this, the Air Force put into effect 
programs for sexual assault and harassment educational training for cadets.207 
Of the sexual assault cases forty percent of them involved alcohol. Officials at the 
Academy responded by implementing stricter regulation regarding the drinking alcohol. 
For example, the academy discharged cadet following the second drinking infraction.208 
Superintendent Rosa was responsible for implementing many of these changes and 
recognized that the main problem at the Academy stemmed from the leaders creating an 
hostile environment that discouraged sexual harassment and sexual assault complaints.209 
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This research revealed that intimidation factored as another problem. The panel 
concluded that Colonel Slavec created an environment so hostile that the cadets did not 
feel comfortable reporting the sexual assaults they endured. Slavec’s mentality, along 
with her harsh leadership caused the cadets to feel unsafe.210 For example, a victim chose 
to send an anonymous email instead of referring her complaint to the chain of command, 
this indicated that to some extent a hostile relationship existed between the cadets and 
their leadership. 
The Air Force removed four of culpable leaders identified in the investigation, 
with one of them, Lt. Gen. Dallager receiving a grade reduction and a forced resignation 
from service, while others received reassignments.211  
The military culture, coupled with negligent leadership, and lack of proper 
reporting due to fear of reprisal contributed to the sexual assaults. This in turn created a 
higher rate of mishandled information and underreported incidences. Cadets suffered 
greatly with physical and psychological abuse, but proper services did not appear helpful 
when needed. It is the responsibility of the military’s higher leadership to protect the 
rights of the cadets as they serve their time in school and eventually, active duty. With 
ongoing sexual assaults, cadets were unable to thrive in their environment which inhibits 




                                                 





Chapter 5. The Deadly Consequences of Toxic Masculinity, 2000-2010 
Gendered Violence: A Weapon of Mass Destruction 
The United States’ military invasions and occupations in pursuit of its “war on 
terror” continued its dark legacy of gender-based violence. Top ranking officials 
sanctioned the use of torture and brutal interrogation techniques, debasing treatment, 
psychological maltreatment and sexual violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, creating an 
environment which granted practical immunity to perpetrators of these criminal acts. The 
United States military subjected scores of Afghan and Iraqi citizens to inhumane 
treatment. Evidence revealed an internalization of this behavior within the military 
community. The shocking number of sexual assaults committed by fellow service-
members in early twenty-first century bear witness to this fact. This is not to say that 
gender-based violence is a recent occurrence in the United States Armed Forces, its 
existence is well documented. Militaries throughout the world use sexualized violence as 
means to regulate the behavior of occupied lands.   
Historically, armed forces used sexual violence as strategy of war. The patriarchal 
nature of the military promotes strict gender roles that associates so-called manliness with 
power and regards male homosexuality and femininity with weakness. This type 
environment becomes a breeding ground for sexual assault and sexual harassment. 
According to Aaron Belkin, a professor of political science at San Francisco State 
University, within the United States armed forces there exists a “rape culture,” he 
explains:     
…an organization that is very masculinist and that places a lot of value on 
dominance and power and subordination. You also have a system that’s trying to 




have to train people how to become violent. In the training scenario you create 
a…dynamic where commanders have almost unlimited authority over people they 
are in charge of. When you put these three factors together, you have a recipe for 
rape.212  
 
Detainees experienced sexual violence at the hands of US civilians and service-
members. Guards and those working at the Abu Ghraib prison on behalf of the US 
government humiliated detainees in order to extract intelligence. These degradations and 
abuses included coercing captives to wear women’s undergarments, mimic sex, 
masturbate, engage in oral sex, and forced sodomy. In a military probe into abuse 
allegations, Major General Antonio Taguba discovered photographs and videos of naked 
female detainees and a US military officer engaged in sexual intercourse with a detained 
Iraqi woman. One female prisoner of Abu Ghraib stated that a fellow woman prisoner 
disclosed experiencing rape more than seventeen times at the hands of US Forces.213  
The Abuses of Abu Ghraib indicated that race and gender-based violence against 
prisoners in the US-run prisons as a widespread problem. Legal representatives of female 
detainees in Abu Ghraib points out that these type of abuses occurred as a norm at 
detention center across Iraq.214     
 In 2005, a report issued by the Iraqi National Association for Human Rights 
outlined the abuse of women detainees in different detention facilities in Iraq, it 
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documented the methodical use of rape by investigators.215  In some circumstances, in 
order to get men to confess, US forces transported female family members to prisons and 
threatened them with rape.216 For example, US troops operating in the Al-Mosul, Iraq 
area, detained female relatives to coerce the surrender of Iraqi fighters.217 These 
disturbing methods of prisoner interrogation mirrored those employed in Uruguay and in 
other societies. In her book, Becoming the Tupamaros, Lindsey Churchill illustrates how 
the military regime treated leftist fighters.218 She explores how the authoritarian 
Uruguayan government would rape female family members in front of incarcerated males 
in order to debase prisoner’s masculinity.  
While detained, Iraqi women endured various forms of psychological and 
physical maltreatment, as well as exposure to inhumane living conditions.219 In 2005, 
British Parliamentary member Ann Clwyd substantiated a report that US troops attached 
a harness to an elderly Iraqi woman and rode her as if she was a donkey.220 The detention 
center in Al-Babel confined young girls with adults, leaving them susceptible to sexual 
violence.221 In 2003, a female detained at Abu Ghraib, managed to secretly send a letter 
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out of that facility. The message described how American service-members raped 
females in their custody and forced them to disrobe in the presence of men.222  
The war in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate that the United States used gender 
based violence as a strategy in pursuit of the so-called war on terror. The methods 
employed share many similarities with those used in Latin America and other parts of the 
world. Although the United States government denied that it uses such methods. Using 
sexualized violence only creates more enemies and increases the likelihood of attacks 
against US interest. For example, in response to prisoner abuse, Iraqi civilians gathered in 
protest in front of the Abu Ghraib detention facility chanting “US Army go home.”223  
Camp Taji, Iraq  
 In the course of the war in Iraq several women soldiers based from units based at 
Fort Hood, Texas, died of strange "non-combat related injuries" at the same area of 
operation in Iraq, Camp Taji. The Fourth Infantry Division and from 1st Armored 
Cavalry Division are organizations that call Fort Hood home. These respected divisions 
deploy soldiers in support of numerous tactical operations around the world and 
unfortunately some of those deployed do not return alive. In two cases, sexual assaults 
occurred prior to their deaths and in another it happened before deployment.   
While deployed to Iraq, in February 2006, a fellow soldier raped Private First 
Class (Private First Class) Tina Priest of the 5th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade Combat 
                                                 
222 MG Antonio Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, 
(Department of the Army, October 2004), 16-7. 
223 Luke Harding, “Pleading Prisoners and Families Outside Protest at the Horrors of Abu Ghraib 
Jail,” The Guardian, May 5, 2004, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/06/iraq.lukeharding, 





Team, 4th Infantry Division, based at Fort Hood, Texas. Eleven days after the assault, on 
March 1, 2006, she was found dead.  In an 800 page document US Army investigators 
ruled the cause of death as a self-inflicted M-16 shot wound.224 Joy Priest, the mother of 
Private First Class Priest challenged the Army's findings. According to Mrs. Priest, she 
spoke with her daughter several times in the days following the rape. She maintained that 
while extremely distressed about the sexual assault, her daughter did not seem suicidal.225 
The overriding question on Mrs. Priest’s mind was how could her 5-foot-tall daughter, 
with short arms, hold the M-16 at the angle necessary to inflict the fatal gunshot wound? 
The Army investigators made efforts to explain the conclusions; however, Mrs. Priest and 
800 pages of provided material debunked the Army’s claim.226 The officials then said, 
Tina used her toe to pull the trigger of the weapon that killed her. Military law 
enforcement investigated Priest’s death as a suicide and as a possible homicide. 
 In the weeks that followed Priest’s death, the military dropped the rape charges 
against the service-member whose sperm investigators found on her sleeping bag. The 
legal proceedings resulted in the soldier’s receiving non-judicial punishment for failing to 
obey a lawful order. The alleged perpetrator received a punishment that included 
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forfeiture of half a month’s pay ($714) for two months, thirty days restriction to the base 
and forty-five days of extra duty.227  
Once again at Camp Taji, on May 11, 2006, only ten days after the death of Tina 
Priest, 19-year-old Private First Class Amy Duerksen succumbed to her wound three days 
after "a self-inflicted gunshot."228 Investigators reported that Duerkson had her diary open 
to page on which she wrote about experiencing sexual assault during training after 
unwittingly ingesting some kind of date-rape drug. Just as in the Priest case, the Army 
maintained that Duerksen committed suicide. After her death, the Army charged the 
individual she identified as her assailant in her diary with rape. Many of those who knew 
Amy did not accept the claim that she shot herself; however, the Army did not conduct a 
homicide investigation.229 
Four months later, in September 2006, a Humvee travelling on a perimeter road at 
Camp Taji discovered a US soldier lying on the ground. She was near death, with injuries 
that included crushed ribs and a ruptured spleen with tire treads marks on the right side of 
her body. The soldier was twenty year old Private First Class Hannah Gunterman 
McKinney of the 44th Corps Support Battalion, based at Ft. Lewis, WA.230  Military 
officials claimed that a vehicle struck her while she attempted to cross the road from a 
guard tower to a latrine and therefore ruled her death an accident. Hours later, officials 
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notified McKinney’s parents, Barbie and Matt Heavrin that their daughter died of injuries 
sustained when an army vehicle ran her over; however, further inquiry into this tragedy 
exposed a story more troubling than the one the Army revealed.231 Later, a more thorough 
investigation determined that a drunken sergeant ran over her with a vehicle after he 
sexually assaulted her. The investigation established that she either fell or someone 
pushed her from the vehicle. Sergeant Shell entered a guilty plea to the charges of 
drinking in a combat zone, drunken driving, consensual sodomy with an incapacitated 
junior soldier, and supplying alcohol to an underage soldier. A military judge sentenced 
Shell to 13 months in prison and demotion to private; however, he could remain in the 
Army after completing his confinement period.232 
Over time, the Heavrins eventually learned what transpired at Camp Taji on 
September 4, 2006. A 1,460-page file and court-martial transcription acquired by The 
Washington Post under the Freedom of Information Act contained many of the specifics 
of the case.233 
McKinney joined the Army Reserve in 2003 and a year later she became pregnant 
with her son Todd. She returned to California after her relationship ended with Todd's 
father, nevertheless, in 2005, she elected to go on active duty in order to provide a better 
life for her son. She erroneously assured her family that the military would not deploy a 
single mother into a combat zone. Months following her training, McKinney deployed to 
                                                 
231 Vernon Loeb “Army Pfc. Hannah L. McKinney, 20, Redlands; Killed in Humvee Accident” 
Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2006, , http://articles.latimes.com/2006/sep/24/local/me-mckinney24, 
(accessed April 26, 2016). 





Camp Taji in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Shortly after her arrival, she pulled 
guard duty shifts at guard towers along the perimeter of that installation. 
 According to the case file testimony, Damon Shell and two others sergeants met 
to celebrate the end of their tour of duty on the night that proceeded that fateful 
September morning. Despite the military’s ban on alcohol in a combat environment, one 
of the sergeants managed to purchase vodka and consumed cocktails in their living areas. 
According to their statements, the drunken noncommissioned officers loaded up into a 
Humvee to tell a female guard at one of perimeter tower goodbye. Testimony states, after 
reaching the tower, Shell attempted to persuade two female soldiers to kiss him; however, 
they refused. At 3 a.m. the sergeants stopped at McKinney’s guard tower. Shell invited 
her down to accompany them in the vehicle. 
Following McKinney’s funeral, specific details of the incident started to come to 
light, when Mrs. Heavrin asked Army investigators for "all the details." She discovered 
that her daughter’s fatality was a criminal case. 
According to Shell, McKinney became "really drunk after drinking just one glass" 
of vodka and orange juice at the living quarters. Shell then had sex with McKinney in her 
incoherent state. Afterwards, Shell attempted to take McKinney back to her assigned 
guard tower; however she "was in no shape" to perform her duties.234 
Shell departed the tower at approximately 5:35 a.m. with McKinney in the 
Humvee, which weight about 10,000 pound. As Shell drove the vehicle, he maneuvered 
into a space between a passing vehicular convoy and observed McKinney hunched 
forward in the seat adjacent to him. Shell explained that while proceeding along the road, 





he heard the vehicle’s door swing open and felt the familiar bump, at the point where the 
dirt and gravel road suddenly becomes concrete and then a second unexpected bump that 
felt as though he ran over something.235 He noticed the door ajar, and McKinney gone. 
Shell said, "I knew it was a possibility that I had run her over,"236 Yet, he continued to his 
living area and bedded down as McKinney lay dying on the road. Somewhere around or 
about 5:45 a.m. two service-members in a Humvee found McKinney. 
The Heavrins came to Fort Hood, Texas, and anticipated a guilty verdict in the 
court-martial of the man on trial for their daughter’s death. Shell pleaded no contest to the 
charges of drinking, drunken driving and consensual sodomy and his attorneys 
acknowledged that he ran over McKinney. The singular question, a judge needed to 
decide, was whether Shell's actions constituted involuntary manslaughter.237 
According to prosecutors, the mandatory measure of negligence was evident in 
"the totality" of Shell's conduct, drunk driving in a combat zone with an underage 
individual, supplying alcohol to a junior soldier resulting in incapacitation and whose 
Humvee door he secured. 
The defense attorneys presented the case as an unpreventable accident that Shell 
had no control over. They called in an accident reconstruction expert who pointed out 
that Shell did not exceed the speed limit or swerve, as a witness for the prosecution 
testified, and that the doors of the Humvee tended to pop open.238 
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The court-martial panel sentenced Shell only on the three lesser charges to which 
he entered a guilty plea. As result, he would serve thirteen months confinement and 
received a demotion to private with no discharge from the service.239 
With McKinney death, the Heavrins have custody of their grandson. Mrs. Heavrin 
often imagines herself in the courtroom and showing Shell her daughter’s Army beret 
telling him "Here's the No. 1 reason you should have stopped for her. You're a fellow 
soldier."240 
Other questionable "non-combat related injury" fatalities in Camp Taji area 
include PFC Melissa J. Hobart of Fort Hood's 1st Armored Cavalry Division in June 
2004, Sergeant Jeannette Dunn 1st Armored Cavalry in November 2006, Specialist 
Kamisha J. Block of the 89th Military Police Brigade in August, 2007, Specialist Marisol 
Heredia of the 4th Infantry Division in September 2007 and Specialist Keisha M. Morgan 
of the 4th Infantry Division in February 2008. Army officials did not classify these 
fatalities as suicides; however, the suspicious circumstances surrounding their deaths 
demands further investigation due to some serious unanswered questions regarding these 
tragedies.241  
Mahmoudiyah, Iraq 
On February 16, 2005, Steven D. Green signed a contract to serve a total of four 
years and nineteen weeks in the US Army. After Green completed basic training and 
advanced individual training as an infantry man, he received orders that assigned him to 
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Company B, First Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment of the 101st Airborne (Air 
Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. On September 24, 2005, Green deployed to Iraq to 
a small city about 19 miles south of Baghdad called Mahmoudiyah.242 On the afternoon 
of March 12, 2006, Green along with other soldier of his unit, Paul Edward Cortez, James 
Paul Barker, Jesse Von-Hess Spielman, and Bryan Lee Howard, played cards and 
willfully disobeyed Army General Order One by drinking and possessing alcohol  on 
duty at an Army Traffic Checkpoint referred to as TCP-2. As the service-members drank, 
Green expressed his desire to avenge the deaths of several US soldiers by killing Iraqi 
civilians. With some persistence Green persuaded Barker to partake in his plan. Barker 
informed Green of a house close to their location where an Iraqi family resided. Barker 
also proposed that they rape one of the women. Green and Barker managed to convince 
Cortez and Spielman to join them as well.243 
In preparation for carrying out their heinous plan, Barker and Cortez changed into 
all black and wore a ski masks. Green used an Army issued brown t-shirt to conceal his 
face. As they set forth, Green left armed with a shotgun while the other carried with them 
military issued M-14 or an M-4 rifle. Howard stayed behind at TCP-2 with instructions to 
warn the others over the ICOM two way radio device, if he observed any Army personnel 
coming towards TCP-2. The group departed their position through a space between the 
wire fence that enclosed the checkpoint and proceeded approximately 400 meters into a 
                                                 





field to a chain-link fence. They breached the barrier by cutting a hole through it to get to 
the other side.244 
Once Green and his accomplices reached the other side of the fence, they darted 
to the residence Barker designated. Green and Spielman advanced towards an Iraqi man 
Kassem Hamza Rachid Al-Janabi, and his six-year-old daughter, Hadeel Kassem Hamza 
Al-Janabi. The assailants then forced the father and daughter into their house where 
Fakhriya Taha Mohsine Al-Janabi, Kassem’s wife and fourteen-year-old Abeer Kassem 
Hamza Al-Janabi watched in disbelief as the home invasion transpired. Green and 
Spielman moved  Kassem, Fakhriya, and Hadeel into one of the bedrooms. Green 
remained inside the room with the family while Spielman shut the door and stood 
outside. Cortez and Barker dragged Abeer to the living room. Cortez shoved Abeer to the 
floor, yanked off selected portions of her garments, and pulled her dress above her waist. 
Cortez and Barker assisted each other in carrying out the sexual assault. One held Abeer 
down while the other raped her. During the sexual assault, the sound of gunshots came 
from inside the bedroom where Green held the rest of the family. In response to the 
discharge of the firearm, Spielman knocked on the bedroom door. Green stated that 
everything was okay and proceeded to living room. Green set the AK-47 rifle down in the 
corner of the living room and announced that he killed the members of the Al-Janabi 
family held in the bedroom. Green’s comrades noticed that he became agitated and acted 
irate. Green sexually assaulted Abeer, while Cortez restrained her. After Green finished 
this heinous act, he grabbed the AK-47 rifle, placed a pillow over Abeer’s head, and shot 
her multiple times in the face. At the recommendation of one of the perpetrators, Barker 





poured kerosene onto Abeer’s body from a lamp found in the house and set her remains 
ablaze. The group departed the scene of the crime after Green uttered that he opened the 
valve of a propane-tank to trigger an explosion in the house. The group travelled along 
the same path in the reverse direction back to TCP-2 and discarded their clothing in burn 
pit used for waste. Cortez directed Spielman to get rid of the AK-47 rifle that Green used 
in the killings. Spielman threw the firearm into the canal in the vicinity of the 
checkpoint.245 
 Later that afternoon, Iraqi civilians notified TCP-1 of a house near TCP-2 set on 
fire with several bodies that included the charred remains of a possible female rape 
victim. The noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) of TCP-1 contacted TCP-2 and 
expressed that he planned to send a patrol to investigate the house behind TCP-2 and he 
required extra personnel. Approximately twenty minutes later, Sergeant Anthony Yribe 
set forth to TCP-2 along with an Iraqi interpreter and several Iraqi Army soldiers 
stationed at TCP-1. Cortez and Spielman also accompanied Sergeant. Yribe’s team to the 
Al-Janabi house.246 
When the investigation team arrived, they immediately noticed the remains of a 
woman with bullet wounds to the face and with significant areas of her body burned 
beyond recognition. In another room of the house, the team found three dead bodies, all 
shot in the head and chest at close range. The investigation team mistakenly blamed 
killings on Iraqi counterinsurgents and did not initiate a criminal investigation. Upon 
their return to  TCP-2, Green, in front of Barker, revealed to Yribe that he killed the Al-
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Janabi family. Later, in that same day, Yribe met with both his superior and the company 
commander, Captain John Goodwin, in regard to the investigation, but he did not divulge 
any information about Green’s disturbing admission. The following day, on March 13, 
Yribe, in Barker’s presence, questioned Green concerning the incidents of the previous 
day, and Green again confessed to the killings.247 
 On March 28, 2006, a Combat Stress Team, diagnosed Green with both an anti-
social personality disorder and an adjustment disorder with depressed mood. On April 2, 
based on the findings of the Combat Stress Team, Brigade Commander Colonel Todd J. 
Ebel requested an early release from the Iraqi theater of operations for Green. On April 
14, Green received a written notice from his company commander, Goodwin, indicated 
his intent to initiate action in accordance with Army Regulation 635-200 5-13 to separate 
Green from the armed forces due to his personality disorder established on the grounds 
that it “interferes with [Green’s] ability to perform [his] duties and be a productive 
soldier.” 248 Cpt. Goodwin recommended an honorable discharge. On May 3, Green 
received orders that released from the Iraqi theater.249 
While awaiting his release, Green did not make any allegation of the Army failure 
to follow its regulations or challenge the validity of his discharge. On May 9, Green 
received orders that reassigned him to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for transitional 
processing out the service. Green’s separation order declared that, “after processing,” 
designated May 16  as his official date of discharge from the 101st Airborne (Air 
                                                 






Assault) unless changed or rescinded. On May 15, Green received the “Final Installation 
Clearance” stamp on his separation orders. The following day, on May 16, Green ended 
his time in military with a total of fifteen months of active federal service. The Army 
issued Green his Department of Defense Form 214, the Certificate of Release or 
Discharge From Active Duty, which indicated an honorable discharge attributed to a 
personality disorder.250 
 On June 20, 2006, in the course of a debriefing, Private First Class Justin Watt, 
who also served in the Green’s unit, told an Army combat stress counselor, that in March 
2006, US soldiers sexually assaulted and murdered an Iraqi female and unlawfully took 
the lives of  three other Iraqis. The information Watt provided contradicted the report of 
the initial investigation team, which blamed the killings on Iraqi counterinsurgents. The 
Army combat stress counselor conveyed Watt’s statement to his chain of command. On 
June 24, 2006, the battalion commander questioned Barker, Cortez, Spielman, and 
Howard regarding the incident near TCP-2. Following proper protocol, the commander 
then disclosed all the information he collected to the United States Army Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID), which initiated an official criminal investigation. CID 
investigators talked to witnesses, which included Barker, Cortez, Spielman, and Howard, 
each of whom provided written statements wherein they confessed to the extent of their 
involvement in both the rape of Abeer and the subsequent killings. Barker, Cortez, and 
Spielman pinpointed Green as the shooter of all four victims. Investigators also acquired 
a written account from Yribe, in which he mentions the two statements made by Green 
shortly after the horrendous event. Investigators also talked with a friend of Green and 
                                                 




two other soldiers, each of whom maintained that Green revealed to them that he raped an 
Iraqi girl and killed both her and her family.251 
 For the roles they played in the Al-Janabi murders, the Army prosecuted Barker, 
Cortez, Spielman, and Howard under Uniform Code of Military Justice. The military 
court-martialed Barker, Cortez, and Spielman on indictments for murder, conspiracy, 
obstruction of justice, arson, and housebreaking, however no charges for sexual assault. 
In exchange for their guilty pleas, the convening authority decided to limit their sentences 
to a maximum of 90, 100, and 110 years in confinement which carried with it a 
dishonorable discharge and the possibility of parole for these predators after serving ten 
years.252   
 The Army no longer possessed court-martial jurisdiction over Green due to his 
discharge from the military, and the general federal criminal statutes did not apply to his 
murderous and sexual predatory actions outside of the United States. Thus, civilian 
prosecutors pursued charges against him under Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act 
(MEJA) for his part in the criminal acts committed against the Al-Janabi family. On 
November 2, a federal grand jury indicted Green with sixteen crimes: 
• conspiracy to commit, murder (Count 1)  
• conspiracy to commit, aggravated sexual abuse (Count 2) 
• four counts of premeditated murder (Counts 3-6),  
• four counts of felony murder (Counts 7-10),  
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• aggravated sexual abuse (Count 11) 
• aggravated sexual abuse of a child (Count 12) 
• our counts of use of a firearm during a crime of violence (Counts 13-16).  
• obstruction of justice under (count 17)18 USC.§ 1512(c)(1) (2006). 
 The indictment contained within it a notification of special findings in regard to 
Counts 3-10 and 13-16 which, if substantiated, Green might face the death penalty. The 
United States later declared that it intended to pursue the death penalty, which required 
Green to stand trial and did allow for him to plead guilty.253 
 Green's trial began on April 27, 2009. The prosecution rested its case on May 4, 
2009. On May 7, 2009, a federal jury found Green guilty of the charges of rape and 
murder, for which he could possibly face the death penalty. However, on May 20, 2009, 
the inability of the jury of nine men and three women reached an agreement on a penalty 
that spared Green the death penalty, resulting in life without parole. Green formally 
received his sentence on September 4, 2009.254 Green challenged his convictions on the 
grounds that the legal authority to try him remained with the military; and MEJA violated 
the constitution; however, in August 2011, Green lost his appeal.255 
 The Army court-martialed Howard and convicted him as an accessory after the 
fact and conspiracy to obstruct justice, for which the court sentenced him to twenty-
seven-month confinement, rank reduction to Private, and a dishonorable discharge. Yribe, 
who faced charges of dereliction of duty and giving false official statements, asked for a 
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discharge instead of standing trial by court-martial. The Army dropped the charges 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
In 2011, President Obama signed the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell.257 This 
progressive change enabled LGBTQ+ individuals to openly serve in the US Armed 
Forces and to receive benefits that heterosexual families receive. However, this did not 
necessarily mean that the toxic-masculine military culture welcomed this change. 
Two years later, Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta lifted the restriction on 
women in combat roles. Traditionally, the US Armed Forces maintain policies the made 
combat roles exclusive male. The inclusion of women in these combat specialties 
generated intense debates from those who desire to maintain the traditional patriarchal 
roles.258  
The decision to finally open all combat roles to women without exception on 
December 3, 2015, resulted from a continuous effort that started at the conclusion of the 
Second World War, when US Armed Forces officially recognized the status of women 
within in the service. Women’s activism contributed greatly to this progression, by 
challenging institutional and cultural barriers; however, the needs of recruits for a 
volunteer military when male conscription ended in the United States played a major role 
as well. The end of the draft in the early 1970s served as an important event in the 
integration of women and LGBTQ+ into the Armed Forces. It provided real opportunities 
to join the military and fill desperately needed positions during the Cold War. Gender 
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differences in human resource policies vanished quickly in the early 1980s. The Gulf War 
and particularly the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq eliminated the last 
obstructions to the development of policies that allowed the full gender integration and 
removed the ban on LGBTQ+,  and disproved the irrational arguments of exclusion. 
The interconnected relationship between military culture and the patriarchal social 
construction of gender makes it difficult to divorce them from one another. Efforts to 
integrate women posed many challenges for the armed forces. If lawmakers and military 
leaders sincerely wish to tackle the issue sexism and homophobia, they need to direct 
their attention to the source of the problem which is the military’s culture and its 
construction of gender. 
Department of Defense policies failed to prevent sexual harassment and sexual 
assault within the military. Congressional testimony in 2004 uncovered 112 incidents of 
sexual misconduct reported in combat zones.259 Training to prevent sexual harassment 
and assault became a requirement for soldiers by the 1990s, the Department of Defenses 
renewed its focus after the Aberdeen Proving Grounds scandal in 1996 revealed that Drill 
Instructors “coerced or sexually assaulted” the female trainees.260 At the Senate hearing 
to investigate these cases Senator Dirk Kempthorne (R-ID) commented that the Army’s 
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“zero tolerance” did not produce “meaningful policies” that prevented sexual abuse.261 
Whereas other lawmakers erroneously blamed the push to integrate women into male 
units for creating “atmosphere” favorable for these incidents to occur.262 The military 
leadership argued unacceptability of sexual harassment and rape under any condition. 
They regarded it as a leadership failure and declared their intent to get to the heart of the 
problem.263 Shortly after the Aberdeen Proving Grounds incident, the Army announced 
the members of a newly formed task force to investigate sexual harassment/abuse around 
the army; however, another serious problem arose with the selection the Army’s most 
senior enlisted leader, SMA Gene McKinney to the panel. Five female soldiers accused 
McKinney of sexual misconduct, which resulted in his removal from the committee. 
McKinney’s sole conviction on the charge of obstructing justice resulted in a reduction in 
rank to Master Sergeant. Months afterward, he retire with full benefits based on the 
highest position held, Sergeant Major of the Army.264 
The military possesses its own body of laws known as the Uniform Code of 
Justice (UCMJ) which regulates all facets of life within the armed forces, which also 
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include the punishments for violations of these rules. The way the military deals with 
criminal offenses reflects how seriously it regards such transgressions within its culture. 
The UCMJ prohibits sexual assault and establishes specified reporting procedures. 
Regrettably, a gap exists between the sexual assault reported and the investigations or 
court-martials (court cases) within services. For example, in 2012, of the more than 2,661 
dispositions, commanders could not act against 509 subjects due to evidence related 
problems and eighty-one others for being out of jurisdiction or false accusations.265 Many 
victims feel that their leadership does not take such claims seriously. In 2014, Marine 
Corps General James F. Amos explained that the victims simply did not trust in their 
chain of command.266 Thus, recent statistics unequivocally show that victims lack 
confidence in the enforcement of the military laws, suggesting that the culture devalues 
victim’s accounts and experiences. 
The court-martial is another characteristic of the legal system the armed forces 
that gives rise to a culture hostile to those who experience sexual violence. Like its 
counterparts in the civilian sector, the military court must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt and convicts very few accused rapists. In some instances, when a victim reported 
assaults their leaders either did not take the claims seriously or failed to conduct a proper 
investigation of the assault, which indicates a weak level of commitment to eradicate 
gendered violence within the military culture. 
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For instance, in 2005, an Air Force woman reported her sexual assault to her 
supervisor, who simply told her to “work it out” without filing an official rape report. 
Nine years later, after attending an Air Force sexual assault briefing, the victim reported 
her attack once more. The court-martial trial ended with a rape conviction; however, the 
assailant Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Briggs only received a sentence of five months in 
jail, a reprimand and a dismissal from the Air Force.267 In 2011, an article that appeared 
in Newsweek article told the story of the sexual assault of a seventeen-year-old male 
recruit. While conducting a basic combat training course, Michael Harding’s drill 
sergeant repeatedly raped him. When Harding attempted to report his sexual assault to his 
unit commander, the officer ignored him and said to him, “It must have been your fault. 
You must have provoked them.”268 The article mentions that the sergeant whom Harding 
says raped him retired honorably and later, ended up convicted of sexually assaulting 
several underage junior ROTC cadets. The drill sergeant who allegedly raped Harding 
years ago plead guilty to lewd and lascivious acts on a child and received a prison 
sentence.269 
The reporting procedures for crime in military law also plays role in the 
development a rape culture. In accordance with regulations commanding officers wield a 
tremendous amount power in determining whether to investigate or prosecute a crime. 
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For example, a unit commander at their own discretion may decide not to initiate Article 
32 hearing proceedings after a victim reports a crime depending on if he/she does not 
believe the complaint or feels it may negatively impact the mission. Most sexual abuse 
cases do not make it to Article 32 hearing unless the assaulted party pursues means of 
support outside of the organization and even if an Article 32 hearing takes place, the 
character of the assaulted often comes under attack. In 2013, Mark Thompson wrote a 
Time Magazine editorial which described the abusive line of questioning the rape victim 
endured during an Article 32 hearing for a case where three navy midshipmen drugged 
and sexually assaulted female cadet. In course of the proceedings, the defense attorneys:  
attacked her with graphic, repetitive questions, the accuser sometimes gripped her 
meditation beads, a gift from her sexual-assault counselor. The lawyers wanted to 
know if she wore underwear to the party, how wide she opens her mouth during 
oral sex and if she “grinds” when dancing. They asked her if she “felt like a ho” 
the morning after (although Commander Robert Monahan Jr., the hearing officer, 
drew the line when a defendant’s lawyer asked if she carried condoms in her 
purse). “This is harassment,” Susan Burke, her civilian attorney, told military 
prosecutors during a break. “It has to stop!”270 
The reluctance of service-members to report assaults stems from the notion that no one 
will believe their story or that the leaders aware of the situation will not take appropriate 
actions. In many instances, high-ranking officials possess the power to determine guilt or 
ignore the allegations without documenting it. For example, in May 2011, the Associated 
Press reported complaints by victims’ advocates and Congressional leaders that “the 
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military too quickly destroys records from the hundreds of rapes and sexual assaults 
reported confidentially each year.”271  
In 2011, fifteen women and two men filed a class action lawsuit against the 
Department of Defense, claiming that the DOD constructs a military culture that does not 
safeguard sexual assault victims. The lawsuit specifically singled out Robert Gates and 
Donald Rumsfeld claiming that they led institutions in which “to take reasonable steps to 
prevent plaintiffs from being repeatedly raped, sexually assaulted and sexually harassed 
by federal military personnel.” 272 Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) advocated for 
changes in reporting procedures used by the armed forces. She pushed for removal of the 
reporting responsibilities from the chain of command to legal authorities.273 
Sexual assault occurs in all areas of military life, at the academies, permanent 
duty stations, service schools and deployments. The results on a poll taken at military 
academies observed the of 1,906 women surveyed, and 302 sexual assaults occurred 
since their enrollment. Same survey also revealed that “50 % of the female respondents 
and 11% of male respondents experienced some form of sexual harassment after arriving 
at the schools.” Fifty-five of the men polled claimed they experienced sexual assault at 
the school.274 
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The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan brought to light sexual victimization among 
US soldiers at the earliest stages of the military actions. The Connecticut based victims 
advocacy group, the Miles Foundation, testified before a Senate Committee that it 
received reports of 68 sexual assault cases within first eighteen months of combat in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).275 Women 
deployed to combat zones tended to report sexual harassment and sexual assault at higher 
rate than those who did not.276 
Many women who served in the armed forces after the 9/11 terror experienced or 
lived under the constant threat of military sexual trauma before, during and after 
deployments.277 In spite of the severe heat, which increased the risk dehydration, some 
women reduced their water intake to avoid the need to utilize the latrine after dark for 
fear of sexual assault. “It’s no wonder some women in uniform try not to drink too 
much…the most dangerous place on base is often the secluded path to the latrines, where 
many assaults take place.” 278 In Kuwait, a number of women loaded their weapons 
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before going to the latrines with them at night in violation of established policies. In order 
to mitigate restroom rapes, some commander required service-women to travel with 
escorts to the restrooms at night and some installations instituted what became 
colloquially termed as “booty duty” around the women’s living areas and bathrooms to 
deter the sexual predation. Some deployment bases prohibited women from leaving their 
barracks after dark without male companion. 279  A study conducted related to the 
defensive behaviors of female service-members when deployed revealed that, “One 
fourth of the women (25%, n=127) reported that they were armed or ready for self-
defense on base due to their fear of rape, violence, or sexual harassment.”280  The same 
study, also found that 1/3 of their non-deployed service-women sample (n = 177) moved 
off of the military installation to avoid sexual harassment and to attain a sense of security 
they could not attain on base.281 
 Prolonged fear for personal safety can adversely impact service-member’s 
physical and mental health with psychological problems occurring at a rate greater than 
ever before. Female depression and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis tend 
to double that of males. Some researchers attribute it to the inclination of most women to 
“internalize their suffering, developing depressive symptoms, whereas men generally 
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externalize their trauma in some form such as, using substances as coping mechanism.282 
Others investigators identify the high levels of stress that a service-woman experiences 
both on and off the military installation. Many women may not feel safe amongst fellow 
warriors and remain in a constant high state of mental alertness. The long term effects of 
this continuous “on guard” state results in stress response illnesses and anxiety disorders, 
such as PTSD and depression. 
According to a study of more than 200,000 veterans deployed to the Iraq and 
Afghanistan theaters of operation, Thirty percent of the women who test positive for 
signs of PTSD also reported sexually assaults of those with PTSD, many often receive 
diagnosis of depression, eating disorders, or anxiety.283 Sexual assaults against males in 
the armed forces occur at an alarming rate as well. Men outnumber women in the military 
by at about five to one. Despite the epidemic of sexual violence perpetrated against males 
only one percent reported MST and PTSD.284 Some researchers think that the total 
number of sexual assaults that victimize men may outnumber those of committed against 
women; however, males may experience more resistance when they attempt to report. 
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“The Pentagon approximates that thousands of service-men experience some form of 
unwanted sexual contact each year, but only 380 males reported assaults in 2012.285 
Many men who report sexual assault often find themselves diagnosed with substance 
abuse and depression. 
In 2012, the prevalence of sexual misconduct accusations revealed that Army 
policies failed to bring this problem under control, with not only sexual harassment, but 
also with assault and rape. Female service-members testified before Congress about their 
horrible experiences.  The unwillingness to solve issues of sexual harassment, assault and 
rape reveals how lack of will by military leadership resulted in undisciplined service-
members not taking the issue seriously. Despite the fact that Equal Opportunity policies 
empower commanders to deal with cases of sexual harassment; however, fears that such 
reports might adversely impact their career might cause some leaders to downplay claims 
sexual misconduct. The lack of resolve within the Armed Forces hinders efforts to 
eliminate the military patriarchal culture that gives rise to the subculture of sexual 
harassment/abuse and rape.286 
Since the 1980s, DACOWITS pressured the Department of Defense to find an 
effective solution for combatting sexual assaults within the services. In 2013, the Senator 
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) proposed legislation to remove authority in sexual assault 
cases from the chain of command and place it in the hands of legal experts; however, 
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legislators in the Senate blocked the measure out of fear of taking authority from military 
commanders for three years consecutive.287 As the role of women within the armed forces 
expanded, coalitions and alliances formed to fight for and protect servicewomen. The 
DACOWITS, the Women’s Resource and Education Institute (WREI), and the National 
Women’s Law all worked in conjunction with one another to end sexual 
harassment/assault; however, in recent years, new groups joined the effort. Female 
veterans founded the Service Women’s Action Network (SWAN) and Alliance for 
National Defense. The Human Rights Campaign also contributed to the fight against 
Military Sexual Trauma.288 
In 2016, the Secretary of the Defense Ash Carter announced the opening of all 
military occupational specialties including ground combat, to women289 With the end of 
the exclusion policies, the US Armed Forces no longer characterized “combat roles” as 
an exclusively male realm. Instead, all areas of the battlefield became a place for all 
warrior regardless of gender. In the 1970s, as the military began transitioning into an all-
volunteer force, most male dominated units lacked female mentors and roles models for 
success for the growing number of women. Upon realization, the Army took a different 
approach in 2016, and made the integration of female leaders into combat arms 
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specialties. Kirsten Griest, one of the first two women graduates from the Rangers’ 
course in August 2015, made history again in April 2016, by the Army’s first female 
infantry officer.290 In the months that followed, the Army assigned junior ranking service-
women to ground combat occupations and organizations, with women already in 
positions of leadership. In spite of these breakthrough accomplishments, history still 
suggests that many challenges lie ahead for women integrating into combat arms. While 
some males support these changes, others may resent the presence and challenge the 
leadership of women in the formerly males only job specialties.  
In general, post-Cold War military leaders demonstrated a lack of commitment in 
their efforts to find an effective solution to end sexual discrimination. The Tailhook 
Incident provided an example of covering-up wrongdoings for personal career interest. 
The US Congress possesses the authority to make all the policies that promote equal 
opportunities for women and LGBTQ+ troops in armed forces, but laws cannot change 
the mindset of the leadership and personnel within the military. The admittance of 
women into combat arms and the lifting of the ban of homosexuals only initiated a new 
era in the ongoing struggle for women and LGBTQ+ warriors to achieve equality in the 
United States Armed Forces. Until the Armed Forces abandon their hyper masculine 
culture, women and LGBTQ+ will continue to remain outsiders and subject to 
maltreatment within the Armed Forces. 
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